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Chapter 1: Introduction

This paper sets itself upon analyzing the Iraq War of 2003 through the lens of
modern Just War Theory. We will begin with a curt summary of Iraq’s history, focusing
particularly on its determinedly odious leader, Saddam Hussein. Thereon, we will be
analyzing a pro-war security argument, the aim of which is to assess the threat of Hussein’s
weaponry ambitions and what that threat meant to the world. Next, we will be going over
the tenets of Just War Theory itself, tracing its history from Rome to the modern doorstep,
and applying the security argument to its dictum. Afterwards, we move into the anti-war
segment and shall unpack the subject of Iraq’s oil resources and whether or not the United
States’ actions disqualify the intervention from achieving Just War status. Then, our next
section shall be addressing the same question of potential disqualification, only this time
from the angle of the war’s questionable legality. Finally, we shall conclude on the ultimate
query of this paper: was the U.S. decision to intervene in 2003’s Iraq compatible with the
modern principles of Just War Theory?
If one were forced to settle upon a single word to describe the nature of politics, one
may very well consider ‘interconnectivity.’ Most, if not all, historical events to have
surfaced within the political field were caused by other events and led to others still, with
each event forming its own network of sub-networks, all to the tune of fractal regress. To
make matters all the more taxing for the observer, no political event ever takes place
within a vacuum. Countless elements manage to interplay and impact one another as the
crucible of the political field plays host to the chaos of people, places, and happenings. In
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order to dig one’s claws into a political subject for anything approximating a useful
analysis, it is crucial to partition the scope of focus. From this emerges the danger of
parochial thinking and limited context. In order to avoid these perilous factors, one must
clearly state where the borders of the analysis rest and briefly illustrate some of the
background information.
This study on the U.S. intervention of 2003 in the state of Iraq will cover numerous
aspects of the war. The three pillars of the thesis are as follows: consideration of a prointerventionist security argument as it fits within the parameters of Just War Theory,
consideration of an anti-interventionist position concerning the acquisition of valuable
local resources by interventionist brigandage, and the overall question of the war’s
lawfulness. All three of these pillars will be considered within the context of Just War
Theory, which will be excavated in greater detail at the conclusion of the Security
Argument. The contentions of this work will not stray from these topics. The overarching
question that this paper will consider is as follows: could the decision to intervene in
2003’s Iraq be classed as amenable to modern Just War Theory? In light of this declaration
of what will be discussed, it is just as important to highlight what will not be addressed in
this work.

What will not be Discussed
This paper will not address the execution of the War itself, either with regard to the
tactics adopted or the various legal and political controversies that came to follow the
intervention (namely: Abu Ghraib, torture, extraordinary rendition, civilian casualties,
8

Blackwater, etc). The matter of resource accruement, despite its relevance extending well
beyond March of 2003, will be covered due to its potential as a deciding factor in the United
States’ initial intervention.
Thus, this is not a paper that will critique the coalition forces in bello. This analysis
seeks solely to determine whether or not the decision to intervene satisfies the
requirements of modern Just War Theory. Before we go into how this will be approached,
certain aspects of the subject matter need to be addressed.

The Purpose of this Work
The Iraq War represents a grave affair of the highest order. This is equally true from
political, social, historical, and humanist perspectives. In no way should this subject be
approached flippantly or with casual removal. This conflict resulted in the loss of many
lives, a great deal of destruction, and heavy costs elsewhere. These tragic and sobering
aspects should never be lost sight of in any analysis of the War, and it is because of these
serious costs that the conflict warrants nothing less than serious scholarship.
The ultimate objective of this work is to contribute as strongly and vitally to the
public discourse as can be managed by the arguments of this paper. Due to a high degree of
uniform opinion on this subject, many of the arguments explored in this paper are largely
unaddressed in mainstream scholarship and are, subsequently, all the more crucial to
adduce and examine. This paper actively demands that these arguments be met with
contention and rejoinder for the sake, yet again, of a stimulated discourse. Taking a brief
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cue from John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, it can be assuredly said that the dialectic profits from
an open ‘marketplace of ideas’ that values adversity and constant intellectual challenge,
either such that reigning ideas continually prove their worth by their relentless defeat of
persistent opposition, or that reigning ideas are dethroned by the introduction of better
theories. What the dialectic does not benefit from, however, is a flabby consensus sitting
atop an unchallenged throne. In many ways, this is a fitting characterization of
intellectualism surrounding the Iraq War, as many of this paper’s arguments are not widely
syndicated in mass media. Given the stark seriousness of the war, this subject is owed (at
the bare minimum) an equally serious, thoughtful, and vibrant dialectic. As a result, this
paper is not interested in supporting the intervention of 2003, nor does it look to produce
Bush administration apologetics. It is interested in the invigoration of discussion
surrounding the conflict and inviting intellectual challenge and opposition, as the best way
to strengthen the anti-war position is to strengthen the pro-war arguments that it must
topple.

Chapter Outline
These arguments, in brief, will take the following form: Firstly, after the brief
description of the subject’s background in Chapter 2, Chapter 3’s Security Argument
addresses the history of WMD’s in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Split into two sections, what we
knew before the intervention and what we know after, this chapter aims to establish a fully
demonstrable and unrelenting desire, on the part of Saddam Hussein, to acquire and
produce WMDs. Additionally, it argues that this desire was on the cusp of actualizing into
10

real weaponry, with the then degrading of highly controversial sanctions (which were the
only entities holding Hussein in a temporary non-weapons limbo) and the approaching
willingness of Hussein to begin production, regardless of sanctions still being in place. The
chapter then goes on to discuss the unique dangers of Saddam Hussein possessing WMDs,
which would constitute a colossal threat at the international level.
In Chapter 4, the paper embarks on a study of Just War Theory and its expansive
history. Upon laying out the standards the Just War Tradition, the paper attempts to apply
the recognized requirements for a Just War to the previous chapter’s Security Argument.
In Chapter 5, the paper discusses the role of Iraq’s luxuriant oil supplies and
whether or not they constituted the primary motivation for intervention. It studies the
relationship between Iraq’s new government and the United States, the current contractual
landscape to see who is profiting where, the oil industry ties that existed within the Bush
Administration, and submitted evidence of pre-war U.S. government plans for Iraq’s oil.
This chapter considers the possibility of illicit U.S. motivation on the part of Iraqi oil and
whether or not that motivation was existent but simply bungled, in light of evidence
suggesting a minimal return of dividends. Finally, the conclusions of this chapter are
considered within the Just War context.
In Chapter 6, the war’s legality is discussed at both the international and domestic
level. The contents of the United Nation’s Charter are explored, particularly the stipulations
of Chapter 7 and Article 2(4). Additionally, legal opinion from international figures is
discussed in conjunction with the decision to intervene and the connection between the UN
Charter and the United States Constitution is examined. In other words, should an
11

international declaration of the war’s illegality necessitate that the intervention be also
declared unconstitutional? Finally, this chapter’s conclusions are again considered in light
of the requirements dictated by Just War Theory.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes on the overall relationship between the decision to
intervene in 2003’s Iraq and the modern tenets of Just War Theory.
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Chapter 2: Historical Background

The sleepy village of Al-Awja, in central-northern Iraq, plays host to a small number
of herders and tribesmen. On the 28th of April, 1937, this minute township would gift unto
the world Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti. Saddam, whose name translates roughly
to ‘the one who confronts,’ traveled through the nationalistic education system and 3 years
of law school before joining up with the Ba’ath Party in 1957. Taking its ideological cues
from 20th century National Socialism, Ba’athism is a stern brew of Arab nationalism and the
1940’s fascism within which it was born. Concocted by Michel Aflaq and Zaki al-Arsuzi,
Ba’athism would end up playing a significant role in all Middle Eastern politics, particularly
the milieus of Syria and Iraq.
Originally Mesopotamia, Iraq was subject to British colonial mandate until 1932,
when the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed, transferring full independence to the Hashemite
Kingdom, which had previously been a proxy ally of the British leading up to colonial
abandon. July 14th of 1958, one year after Hussein joined the Ba’ath party, brought with it
the winds of revolution and the new Iraqi republic. At the forefront of the revolution, future
president Abdul Salam Arif casually turned on other Ba’athist leaders later that same year.
Saddam, then the Assistant Secretary of the Regional Command, was consequently jailed in
1964.
Three years later, he would successfully escape his captivity. Breaching the walls of
the prison as if a chrysalis, Hussein was reborn into the Iraqi political world a meaningful
figure. The 17th of July, 1968, would see yet another coup and the rise of Ahmed Hassan al13

Bakr, who established the Revolutionary Command Council [RCC] and named Saddam his
deputy. It was during his time in the Ba’ath Party that our future leader developed an
unfailing admiration for Joseph Stalin, and aimed to direct Iraq in a quasi-soviet political
direction upon seizing power, which he had been slowly accruing throughout the 70’s. Once
the internal security forces had allied themselves behind him, a development that had been
greatly helped along by his being appointed a general in 1976, Hussein moved to purge the
Iraqi government on July 22nd, 1979. Balking the now senescent and overthrown al-Bakr,
Hussein’s purge is one of the few to be made available on film for anyone’s viewing
pleasure.
Reclined comfortably in a plush chair, smoking a formidable cigar, Saddam Hussein
looks out from behind a large desk before a full congregation of the Ba’ath Party members
(amounting to roughly 400 people). The auditorium’s already palpable feeling of Mafioso
continues to strengthen with each passing moment as a man is brought before the crowd
and placed behind a podium. With pervasive discomfort, he slowly works his way through a
false confession that declares both him and many other Party members guilty of assisting
in a Syrian-driven plot to overthrow the Party. The purported traitor was a man named
Muhyi Rashid, an RCC secretary, whose entire family was being held hostage by the regime
at the time of the purge. Rashid delivers his confession with a look of unmistakable terror
and despair. At a snail’s pace, he begins to list off the names of those complicit in the ‘plot.’
One-at-a-time, the ‘traitors’ are led into the aisles and out of the auditorium by Saddam’s
Mukhabarat, or secret police, where execution awaits them on the other side. Rashid crawls
his way through name after name, and the noise level of the auditorium rises as panic
begins to inflate. Each member of the Party grips his seat in a cold sweat, as they wonder
14

whether their name will be called next. Mania spreads as certain members jump out of
their seats with tears in their eyes, screaming praise of Hussein as their great leader.
Saddam sits there calmly, smoking his cigar, and this goes on for over an hour.
Saddam had requested that this unique theater be filmed and distributed to the Iraqi
people to provide an example. However, the cameras would not be rolling for the second
stage of the insurrection. All of the selected Party members were executed, including
Rashid, and the firing squads were composed of their former colleagues, those not chosen
in the auditorium, freshly armed with guns by the Mukhabarat on Saddam’s orders.
Arranging for the Ba’ath party to purge itself from within was a suitable baptism to
the corrupt and bloodthirsty rule of Saddam Hussein. One year after the purge would see
Saddam’s invasion of Iran and the beginning of a conflict that would take the lives of
around 1,500,000 people. The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 would be met with the fully
undertaken genocide of the Kurdish Iraqis in the North. These crimes would continue
through to 1991, whereupon Hussein invaded Kuwait and was greeted by international
pushback. At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi people did not have to wait long until they
were graced by a crippling sanctions regime, courtesy of the international community.
Additionally, 1991 would see a rise in Hussein’s southern genocide wielded against the
Shiite Iraqi population. This is a highly cursory review of Saddam’s reign, much of which
will be covered in greater depth throughout this paper; however, it illustrates the historical
continuity of Hussein’s crimes and how global society had come to know him, and how to
expect him to behave. In addition to a career of breathless, unyielding violence, Saddam
Hussein also maintained an obsession over the acquisition of highly destructive weaponry.
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We will go into greater detail on how, after the first Gulf in 1991, the following
decade would come to be marked by chilling concern over Iraqi non-compliance with
international disarmament obligations. The frosty peak of this non-compliance was
reached in 1998, when Saddam Hussein closed Iraq to all international inspections, a state
of affairs that would remain until November of 2002. This paper will more thoroughly
discuss this period, as it is highly integral to understanding the security argument.
On the 11th of September, 2001, members of the al-Qaeda terrorist network
famously attacked the United States. This event has been regularly cited as the precursor
for American intervention in the Middle East, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. The Iraqi
intervention would come two years later, in March of 2003, after numerous international
developments pertaining to Saddam Hussein’s regime and his suspected weapons of mass
destruction. Whether or not September 11th brought a new willingness for the United
States to engage in conflict with Iraq, one must make an effort to understand the full nature
of Iraqi weapons and how it might have motivated action on the part of the coa lition. It is
on this note that we dive into the details.
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Chapter 3: The Security Argument

The security argument takes its place on the center stage of the interventionist
discourse, as it constitutes the most direct appeasement of a justified preventative war
theory. It is a complicated and multifaceted analysis that this thesis will adumbrate. The
components of the security argument are as follows:
1) Iraq’s desire and attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (including a nuclear
capacity) can be plainly displayed by the historical record,
2) the international community, at the time, remained uncertain as to the status of Iraq’s
arsenal of WMDs in the wake of extensive noncompliance with UN Inspection,
3) Iraq’s 1991 weapons programs espoused nuclear ambitions,
4) the contingency of a Ba’athist Iraq possessing WMDs or a nuclear capacity severely
endangers the international community to a historically unparalleled degree,
5) and that, under these observations, preventive intervention falls within the parameters
of Just War theory.

Information Available Before Intervention

17

The construction of a perceptible desire to undertake future action marks a sharp
departure from the scientific and exhaustive forms of political argument. Heuristic as our
first contention is, the possibility to prove desire beyond a reasonable doubt remains open
and available. This first portion of the chapter will limit itself to information that had been
made available prior to the intervention of 2003. Upon observation of the following events,
it was clear and convincing that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq sought out weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear armament.

Defection of Hussein Kamel
When Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid, Saddam Hussein’s Minister of Military
Industries, Supervisor of the Republican Guard, and son-in-law, defected to Jordan in 1995,
the transparency of Iraq’s weaponry ambitions crested, with al-Majid giving numerous
interviews to the press, the United Nations Special Commission [UNSCOM], and the
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on the matter of Hussein’s arsenal. The United
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission [UNMOVIC] says of General
Kamel that he “had enormous influence on [the Military Industrialization Commission’s]
activities and weapons programmes” (UNMOVIC June 27 2007, 39). One of the most telling
and concisely incriminating interviews that al-Majid gave was in the autumn of 1995,
where he told CNN that “we had enriched French uranium that was ready for a bomb and
highly enriched Russian uranium as well” (Kamel September 21 1995). The French element
is very much worth stressing here and shall be addressed more thoroughly at a later point
in this chapter. Al-Majid continues with these illustrations of Iraq’s former proximity to a
18

nuclear capacity, stating that “we designed the shell of the weapon…our first design was for
12 tons and then it went down to six tons…we wanted the missiles to carry the nuclear
weapons” (Kamel September 21 1995). This is definitively plain speaking of the most
disquieting nature. The necessary missiles that al-Majid spoke of bring to mind the nuclear
missiles that Iraq would later attempt to purchase from North Korea in 2003 (we shall
delve further into this point later). When asked on the subject of viability, in response to alMajid’s confession that “our atomic scientists were trying to develop a small nuclear
warhead” (Kamel September 21 1995), the former minister of military industries argued
that “it was meant for long range attack and also to blind spy satellites” (Kamel September
21 1995). On the subject of non-compliance with international measures taken to ensure
the disarmament of Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War, al-Majid states that “the Iraqi team
managed to remove documents in boxes. They concerned chemical and biological weapons
and I believe it also had something to do with nuclear weapons. At that time we scattered
the documents and did not put them in one place. They were hidden in other ministries,
homes, and offices” (Kamel September 21 1995). The campaigns to accrue nuclear
capability and hide that capability from the international community are, depending on the
veracity of al-Majid’s claims, clear as day.
The comments made by Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid to the press are reinforced
even further in his testimony to UNSCOM and the IAEA, where he disclosed troves of
information on Iraq’s nuclear aims. He stated that “Iraq initially had one reactor and
started four different projects…some equipment was buried…but it was recovered
recently…part of this buried equipment was at the Sodash site…other parts were ‘made to
disappear’” (Kamel August 22 1995, 1). He goes into greater detail with the question of
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nuclear centrifuges at the Rashdiyah site, affirming that “they manufacture their own
centrifuges in two ways…one way was from maraging steel and the second - using carbon
fiber…all centrifuges worked but they preferred the ones made of carbon fiber…the activity
was stopped by the [Gulf] war” (Kamel August 22 1995, 2). When asked by Professor
Zifferero, of the IAEA, why it was that the Rashdiyah site was kept from Iraq’s disclosure of
its nuclear centrifuge project in the wake of the war, the minister replied that “it was the
strategy to hide, not to reveal the sites” (Kamel August 22 1995, 2). In testifying to Iraq’s
desire to shroud its nuclear program from UN inspectors in the wake of the Gulf War, the
former minister mentions the name of the project’s leader: Dr. Mahdi Ubeidi. In the
construction of nuclear arms, “they did it both – by chemical and mechanical ways…this
process succeeded but also the centrifuge method…Dr. Ubeidi was in charge…the chemical
way was in Tuwaitha but they have not advanced…it was destroyed during and after the
war” (Kamel August 22 1995, 3). We will be digesting a wadge of Dr. Obeidi’s testimony in a
short while. For al-Majid, the question of continuing production after UN inspection is a
different matter. When asked by the press whether or not Iraq still held the weapons in
question, the minister stated clearly, “no. Iraq does not possess any weapons of mass
destruction…I am being completely honest about this” (Kamel September 21 1995). When
asked the same question during his UNSCOM/IAEA testimony, he replied somewhat
differently, stating “no, but blueprints are still there on microfiches” (Kamel August 22
1995, 3). This is a categorical rejection of the existence of Iraq’s alleged post-Gulf War
stockpile. Also, this remark points directly towards a system resting patiently in place for
Ba’athist Iraq to resume the production of WMDS, regardless of whether or not the
stockpile had been fully turned over after the Gulf War. Even if one is to assume that all
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weapons were destroyed immediately after Desert Storm, the question of an active
program for the accruement and development of WMDS remains a weighty and relevant
one.

UNSCOM Technical Evaluation Meeting
All of this testimony is clearly dependent upon the value of the subject providing it;
however, one can turn to other sources sporting similarly incriminating information. It is
worth noting that one year after al-Majid’s defection, he returned to Iraq in 1996,
whereupon Saddam Hussein forced his returning son-in-law to separate from his wife and
had him executed by the state. In 1997, UNSCOM ran a Technical Evaluation Meeting [TEM]
on Iraq, addressing a series of FFCDs, or Full, Final and Complete Disclosures. UNSCOM, in
its final report on the TEM, states that “since May 1992, a series of [FFCDs] was submitted
to the United Nations Special Commission, the latest being submitted in September 1997”
(United Nations Special Commission April 1 1998, 1.1). Effectively, the purports of these
FFCDs cover the nature of the Iraqi WMD programs from the conclusion of the Gulf War to
late 1997. “The purpose of the TEM was to conduct, through open discussion with Iraq’s
delegation, an examination of all aspects of the proscribed BW [biological weapons]
programme” (United Nations Special Commission April 1 1998, 3.1). The result of these
evaluations was, to say the utter minimum, unsatisfactory. In a general evaluation of the
TEM, UNSCOM remarked that “the FFCD contains major mistakes, inconsistencies and gaps
in information” (United Nations Special Commission April 1 1998, 4.1.1). They also
reported that “the Al-Hazen Institute and many sites of the later BW programme have not
21

been included in the FFCD. The rationale given for the construction and acquisition of all
sites is incomplete…the general lack of information concerning the organization from the
highest levels down, and their connections to functional organs, considerably hampers the
ability to understand the scope of the past BW programme” (United Nations Special
Commission April 1 1998, 4.4.1). The incriminating and concerning aspects of the UNSCOM
report continue; “the FFCD is deficient in reporting the acquisition of supplies, material,
microbiological isolates, munitions, and equipment…without a complete accounting of all
BW programme acquisitions, a material balance is not possible” (United Nations Special
Commission April 1 1998, 4.5.1). Moving swiftly onto the matter of R&D, UNSCOM is again
the reporter of scandal, as “the research and development session was not conducted at a
scientific or technical level because the head of Iraq’s delegation chose to answer most
questions in a superficial manner and frequently deflected the question. Consequently,
little quantitative information was provided” (United Nations Special Commission April 1
1998, 4.6.1). The incriminating nature of this near-six year period continues to compile, as
UNSCOM reports that “the FFCD does not adequately support the actual production
quantities of the four BW agents…acknowledged to be intended for weaponisation” (United
Nations Special Commission April 1 1998, 4.7.1). This last observation is not merely a
matter of absent information, but a case of reportable inconsistency on the accounting of
biological weaponry, as had been formerly taken.
UNSCOM concluded with its TEM that “without a full understanding of all aspects of
Iraq’s BW weapons, it is not possible to assess whether the provisions of Security Council
Resolution 687 have been met” (United Nations Special Commission April 1 1998, 4.8.1).
Resolution 687 famously proclaimed that the international community “decides that Iraq
22

shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under
international supervision, of: all chemical and biological weapons…[and] all ballistic
missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers” (United Nations Security Council April 3
1991). On the matter on deception and concealment, UNSCOM states that “an elaborate
effort was undertaken to conceal and preserve Iraq’s BW programme” (United Nations
Special Commission April 1 1998, 4.10.1). It is more than apparent that the United Nations
Special Commission found the government of Iraq to be in a state of full non-compliance
during the years of 1992 to late 1997. The terms of UN Resolution 687 had not even been
approximately met by Hussein’s Iraq, and the desire to hide and preserve Iraq’s WMD
programs was abundantly evident to the Special Commission. Pursuant to furthering the
impression put upon UNSCOM by the Iraqi government, one can turn to the writings of Rolf
Ekeus, the director of UNSCOM from 1991 to 1997.

Testimony of Rolf Ekeus
Rolf Ekeus, a Swedish diplomat and something of a doyen on the matter of post-Gulf
War Iraqi weapons, writes extensively on the intervention and the critiques surrounding
its justification. As the former head of the UN inspections in Iraq, his evaluation of Iraqi
compliance is integral to understanding what it was the international community felt
before the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. In a piece he composed several
months after the inception of the war in 2003, Ekeus provides a valuable look into how the
international inspection committees, before the intervention of 2003, viewed the Iraqi
security threat. He opens with a finger directly placed atop the pulse of the post23

intervention volksgeist. “With no weapons of mass destruction as yet found in Iraq, the
political criticism against President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair is
mounting…is it now time to join the game of blaming Bush and Blair for an illegitimate or
illegal war?” (Ekeus June 29 2003). The pertinent question is answered by the rest of his
essay in the form of a rejection.
Ekeus begins with the Iran-Iraq War, stating that “chemical weapons were used by
Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-88)…nerve gas, such as sarin, and mustard gas
immediately and painfully killed many thousands of civilians” (Ekeus June 29 2003). He
delves into the motivations behind this protracted and tragic conflict in the subcontinent,
claiming that “for Saddam Hussein, the self-styled, self-promoted defender of the Arab
nation, ‘the Iranian beasts,’ to quote Tariq Aziz in a conversation with me – not the United
States or Israel – were the eternal enemy of Iraq” (Ekeus June 29 2003). This hatred for the
Iranians spawned many undesirables, including an unrelenting attraction to the
acquirement of WMDs. Ekeus writes that “during UNSCOM’s debriefings in Iraq after the
defection [of Hussein Kamal al-Majid], Iraqi biological weapons scientists, able to speak
slightly more openly than normally, explained that their secret work mainly was on
assignments to find means for warfare against the Iranians. Regarding the nuclear weapons
projects, the Iraqi authorities defended their systematic violation of Iraq’s obligations
under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the proposition that Iran, likewise a party
to the treaty, was active in developing its own nuclear weapons. Iraq’s obsession with Iran
was illustrated by its air attack in 1983 on the Iranian nuclear reactors at Busher” (Ekeus
June 29 2003). It is clear that Iraq, according to the former head of UN inspection, had been
in possession of numerous programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, including
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nuclear devices, and the goal of these programs was to be at the expense of the Iranian
people. However, was this program of WMD development and concealment still in place
after the Gulf War inspections?
Ekeus clearly believes so, writing that “Iraqi policy after the Gulf War was to halt all
production of warfare agents and to focus on design and engineering, with the purpose of
activating production and shipping of warfare agents and munitions directly to the
battlefield in the event of war. Many hundreds of chemical engineers and production and
process engineers worked to develop nerve agents, especially VX, with the primary task being
to stabilize the warfare agents in order to optimize a lasting lethal property” (Ekeus June
29 2003). This is a clear and strident condemnation of post 1991-Iraq from the former
UNSCOM director. The exigent nature of these remarks cannot be overstated, as one of the
world’s leading authorities on the subject of certifying the disarmament of a churlish postwar Iraq has charged the regime of Hussein with more than just the guilt of noncompliance, but the existence of an illegal, concealed program for the development of
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Ekeus concludes, writing that
the door is now open for diplomatic initiatives to remake the region into a WMD-free area
and to shape a structure in the Persian Gulf of stability and security. Moreover, the defeat of
the Hussein regime, a deadly opponent to peace between Israelis and Palestinians, has
opened the door to a realistic and re-energized peace process in the Middle East. This is
enough to justify the international military intervention undertaken by the United States
and Britain. To accept the alternative – letting Hussein remain in power with his chemical
and biological weapons capability – would have been to tolerate a continuing destabilizing
arms race in the gulf, including future nuclearization of the region, threats to the world’s
energy supplies, leakage of WMD technology and expertise to terrorist networks, systematic
sabotage of efforts to create and sustain a process of peace between the Israelis and the
Palestinians and the continued terrorizing of the Iraqi people. (Ekeus June 29 2003)
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Here submitted is a spate of gripping reasons that Mr. Ekeus finds to be persuasive enough
to justify the intervention of 2003. This paper will go on to address the Israeli question
more thoroughly. For now, it is clear that Ekeus was convinced of the Iraqi programs that
sought the production and development of WMDs during the decade following the Gulf
War.

Graham Pearson (a Timeline of Non-Compliance)
It is important to note that Ekeus’ remarks were written after the intervention and
the failed attempt to find WMDs within the state of Iraq; however, from the commentary
regarding scientist debriefings after the defection of al-Majid and the UNSCOM TEM report
on the ‘elaborate effort’ to conceal Iraq’s biological weapons program, one can comfortably
conclude that both UNSCOM and Rolf Ekeus were convinced of the existence of Hussein’s
programs to develop and conceal WMDs and, by extension, Hussein’s desire to pursue
these weapons after the Gulf War inspections. Additionally, the inability to turn up WMD
material in the wake of 2003’s intervention has failed to dissuade Ekeus that taking action
was the correct course for the United States to follow. Graham Pearson’s marvelous
volume, the UNSCOM Saga, illustrates the extent to which post-Gulf War Iraq engaged itself
in odious acts of concealment and preservation of WMDs. Also, Pearson’s study is prefaced
by an adulating foreword written by Rolf Ekeus, who regards the work as a “major
contribution” (Pearson 1999, xvi). Regarding acts of concealment and obstruction of
inspection, Pearson notes a multitude of instances, and this paper shall only touch on a
fraction of those.
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In 1992, “Iraq called for a halt to all of UNSCOM’s aerial surveillance flights”
(Pearson 1999, 20). Also, the “UNSCOM inspection team [was] refused access to Iraq’s
Ministry of Agriculture” (Pearson 1999, 20). One remembers that in three years, Hussein
Kamel will defect and report to UNSCOM that, regarding the production of biological
weapons, “before Hakam there was Muthanna. They moved there from Salman Pak. Hakam
was to produce bulk agents. From Salman Pak they moved to Muthanna or to a Ministry of
Agriculture facility in Dora…most work was done at Dora on anthrax” (Kamel August 22
1995, 6). Additionally, al-Majid invokes the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture during the
discussion of Rashdiyah, where nuclear centrifuges were being developed. He states that
“before the Rashidiyah site belonged to the Agricultural Ministry” (Kamel August 22 1995,
2). Such collision of association is sufficient to test one’s refusal of cynicism.
In 1993, “UNSCOM reported on Iraq’s…refusal to permit helicopter surveillance
during on-site inspections and the installation of monitoring cameras to test sites…and
[Iraq] refused to transport chemical weapons-related equipment to a designated site for
destruction under UNSCOM supervision” (Pearson 1999, 22).
In 1994, “Iraq threatened to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA and
move troops towards the border with Kuwait” (Pearson 1999, 27). This constitutes an
abject blackmailing of the international community and a full rejection of Resolution 687,
which Iraq had signed.
In July of 1996, “Iraq denied access by a Special Commission inspection team to
sites in Iraq designated for inspection” (Pearson 1999, 34). Additionally, in November of
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that year, “Iraq refused to allow UNSCOM to remove missile remnants from Iraq” (Pearson
1999, 35).
In 1997, “an Iraqi officer on board on UNSCOM helicopter manhandled an UNSCOM
individual attempting to photograph unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site
designated for inspection” (Pearson 1999, 42).
Finally, on January 13th, 1998, “Iraq had announced that it was withdrawing its
cooperation with the inspection team on the grounds that the inspection team had too
many individuals of US or UK nationality” (Pearson 1999, 44). The history of stubborn noncompliance and illegal concealment by Hussein’s Iraq during the 90’s is a glaring and
disturbing one. Pearson’s contributions continue, as he covers the instances of full-on WMD
discovery and retrieval from Iraq during the same decade; crimes of an even higher order.
Once again, one recalls the defection of Hussein Kamel and his categorical assertion
that Iraq was no longer in possession of WMDs in August of 1995. It is then, in fact,
discombobulating to accommodate oneself with the contents of UNSCOM’s report on
inspection 129 B, which took place from the 24th of February to the 12th of March 1996.
Therein lies a recounting of how “the Commission undertook its own initiative to find
documents…as a consequence, the decision was taken to excavate several destroyed
buildings at Al Muthanna, the site of Iraq’s largest chemical weapons research and
production facility. Since their aerial bombardment in February 1991, access to the
buildings had been considered impossible owing to safety considerations…during this
dangerous and demanding mission, the team discovered and retrieved some 5,000 pages of
printed materials. These included numerous bound volumes, memoranda, organizational
28

papers, booklets, letters, archive records, approximately 100 computer discs, books,
catalogues and published journals. Some articles were intact, while others were in
fragments. In addition, the team removed some 80 munitions and components, including
122 millimetre artillery chemical warheads and 155 millimetre ‘binary’ artillery shells”
(United Nations 1995). Additionally, the same inspection covered the question of nuclear
development, stating that “this mission examined the Iraqi design work on a missile to
deliver a nuclear warhead. Such inspections will be repeated in the future. Some other
cross-disciplinary inspections will also be planned” (United Nations 1995). The report of
this inspection grants the inquirer a certain degree of access to Saddam Hussein’s post-Gulf
War nuclear ambitions, which Ekeus had previously warned of, as well as an indissoluble
example of WMDs in Iraq’s possession after the defection Hussein Kamel. From this, one
can take that he was either lying about Iraq’s retained stockpile, or was made to be
unaware of many Iraqi programs committed to the production and preservation of WMDs
after the Gulf War. Another example of post-August 1995 weapons-unearthing in Iraq came
in February of 1997, where “excavation at one site involved in the secret destruction [took
place]. The excavation produced, amongst other remnants, three virtually intact bombs of
the type Iraq declared as biological weapons” (Pearson 1999, 158). This is as blatant a
violation of Resolution 687 as can be, both on the grounds of possession and concealment.
Also, it furthers the extent to which Hussein Kamel was wrong about Iraq having been fully
rid of its stockpile, prior to his defection in August of 1995.

Conclusions and Further Questions
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This narrative of deplorable obstruction and concealment on the part of Iraq runs
with an impressive consistency from the end of the Gulf War to 1998. The TEM report and
Ekeus’ recounting of scientist debriefings, right after the defection of al-Majid, display the
salience of Saddam Hussein’s programs, as well as his desire, to develop and conceal WMDs
during the post-war 1990’s. The WMDs seized in 1996 and 1997 display Iraq’s proximity to
having these programs bear fruit. From this, it is suggested that a concealed WMD stockpile
could be right around the corner for Iraq in 1997, a year before Iraq withdrew all of its
cooperation from the international community and rejected all UNSCOM access. If Iraq had
wished to avoid conflict, why the campaigns of non-compliance? Why the policy of
developing nerve agents and other WMDs? Why the withheld and concealed capability to
produce WMDs, as well as the WMDs themselves, all of which UNSCOM was trying to
investigate, pursuant to the avoidance of conflict. If Iraq had been perpetually eager to
comply with Resolution 687, why the palpable acts of repeated and flagrant obstruction?
Many have suggested that this was an attempt to strike fear into the hearts of Iranians, a
variation on Ekeus’ characterization of the region, and an attempt that was not mitigated
by Iraq due to its belief that intervention from the International Community would be a
farfetched conclusion to the story. Presuming this is the case, the question must be asked,
who should be held responsible for the repercussions of a dangerous image that Iraq went
about cultivating, Iraq or the international community?

Scott Ritter and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
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Scott Ritter is a former UN inspector of Iraq from 1991 to 1998. On September 3rd,
1998, he provided testimony before the United States Senate regarding what would go on
to be the unanimously passed Iraq Liberation Act of that same year. He had resigned from
his “position with UNSCOM out of frustration because the U.N. Security Council and the
United States, as its most active supporter, was failing to enforce the post-Gulf War
resolutions designed to disarm Iraq” (Ritter September 3 1998). In his testimony to the U.S.
Senate, he makes several telling diagnoses of Iraq’s current weapons programs. One of the
most forwardly distressing conclusions that he submits
is that we have clear evidence that Iraq is retaining prohibited weapons capabilities in the
fields of chemical, biological and ballistic- missile delivery systems of a range of greater than
150 kilometers. And if Iraq has undertaken a concerted effort run at the highest levels
inside Iraq to retain these capabilities, then I see no reason why they would not exercise the
same sort of concealment efforts for their nuclear programs. (Ritter September 3 1998)

Inspector Ritter would go on to be more right than he knew at the time, as intervention
would allow Dr. Mahdi Obeidi to come forward with details on Iraq’s concealment of
nuclear materials during the 1990’s. This paper will go on to address the testimony of Dr.
Obeidi in greater depth. Ritter argues plainly that “if Iraq gave us today a full and final
accounting of all of its weapons of mass destruction – programs and retained weapons
capabilities – our job would be over very quickly. But because we don’t have such an
accounting, our job has become a mission of discovery. We must go forth and find these
weapons that Iraq is hiding. And that could go on a very long time, especially given the level
of Iraqi obstruction today” (Ritter September 3 1998). It is clear that Ritter favors a
thorough and complete inspection of Iraqi weapons and feels that the current Iraqi
government is repeatedly choosing to impede that process.
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In discussing the response to relevant contingencies, Ritter states that “the threat of
force was made back in April 1991 when the Security Council together with the vote and
pushing and backing of the United States passed the original cease-fire resolution. I don’t
see anything that would have caused the law to be altered. Iraq has not been disarmed. I
would assume that that threat of force still exists today” (Ritter September 3 1998). Here,
Ritter considers the use of forceful inspection as a possible option for the international
community, should Iraq continue its campaign of obstruction. Iraq, at this time, would
choose to keep the life-support drip reliably pressed into the vein of its ‘locked-door’
policy, banning all UN inspectors from the country for the next four years. The notion
explored here is a particularly interesting one, as it suggests a classing of the 2003
intervention as merely a continuation of the original Gulf War. With a ceasefire in 1991,
and a perpetuation of that ceasefire being dependent on the compliance of Iraq with UN
inspection efforts, the eventual intervention in 2003 is seen here as simply an ending of
that ceasefire due to non-compliance. Ritter’s contribution to the U.S. Senate in 1998
pushed, in no small part, for the eventual decision taken by the Senate to unanimously pass
the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. The act states that
since March 1996, Iraq has systematically sought to deny weapons inspectors from the
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq access to key facilities and documents, has on
several occasions endangered the safe operation of UNSCOM helicopters transporting
UNSCOM personnel in Iraq, and has persisted in a pattern of deception and concealment
regarding the history of its weapons of mass destruction programs. (United States Congress
January 27 1998)

The influence of Ritter’s testimony is salient in this finding of the U.S. Senate. Contemplative
of the hazards surrounding Iraq’s furtive continuation and concealment of its WMD
programs, the Senate concludes that “it should be the policy of the United States to support
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efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power and to promote the
emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime” (United States Congress
January 27 1998). The United States Senate has found that the unrelenting obstruction of
the Hussein regime has made the imperatives of UN inspections impossible to achieve, and
thus has made it the official policy of the United States to move Iraq into a new, democratic
regime. It is important to note that Section 8 of this act states that “nothing in this Act shall
be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces…in
carrying out this Act” (United States Congress January 27 1998). The authorization to use
force would go on to be applied for in a later act in 2002; however, the Senate had chosen
here to focus its efforts on the support of internal democratic movements in Iraq for the
time being.

Operation Desert Fox of 1998
After the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, December of that same year brought
with it Operation Desert Fox and its stated objective of striking military targets within Iraq
that contributed to Iraq’s production and storage of WMDs. The United States Department
of Defense strutted with a resolute pride after the occasion, stating that
Operation DESERT FOX was a highly successful operation. U.S. and British forces degraded
Iraq’s capability to use weapons of mass destruction in two important ways. First, we
estimate that we delayed Iraq’s development of ballistic missiles by at least a year. This is
going to make it more difficult for Iraq to use deadly chemical and biological weapons
against its neighbors. Second, we diminished Iraq’s overall capability to direct and protect
its weapons of mass destruction program. And we also diminished Iraq’s ability to attack its
neighbors by severely damaging the Iraqi military command and control system. (United
States Department of Defense 1998)
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Regardless of whether or not this operation was intended as government explanations and
context would suggest, it marks something to consider with respect to Iraq’s WMD
pursuits, as the hazards of non-compliance were made to be fully clear to the Hussein
regime throughout the four day duration of the military bombing. Despite this, the regime’s
campaign of international non-compliance would persist for the next 4 years, with Iraq
denying access to all UN inspectors.

1998-2002 the Dark Years: Bombs and UN Rearrangements
It was here that the disconcerting blindfold was put upon the international
community’s eyes for the next few years. Dr. Mahdi Obeidi writes that “Operation Desert
Fox was intended to force Iraq’s full cooperation with the UN inspectors. But it had the
opposite result. Saddam announced he would no longer allow weapons inspectors inside
the country. They would not return until nearly four years later, in the months leading up
to the 2003 war. The United States and its allies referred to the period beginning in
December 1998 as ‘the dark years’ because foreign intelligence about what was happening
inside Iraq, which had relied on reports from inspectors, trickled to almost nothing”
(Obeidi 2004, 175). During this period, the United States and Great Britain bombed several
key areas around Baghdad in 2001. The Guardian Newspaper reported on the 16th of
February, 2001, that “US and British Aircraft have carried out missile attacks on five targets
near the Iraqi capital Baghdad tonight, striking command and control targets to the south
of the city, the Pentagon has confirmed…The Ministry of Defence said that the operation
was carried out because over the last few weeks the coalition had experienced increased
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threats to their aircraft and personnel” (Guardian February 16 2001). These bombings,
however, would do nothing to loosen or pry open the Iraqi doors to inspection. While
squalid silence was undertaken by Hussein’s regime, the United Nations began to
restructure its inspection apparatus. With the dissolution of UNSCOM came the creation of
UNMOVIC, which was to inherit all of UNSCOM’s former responsibilities within the state of
Iraq. 1999’s United Nations Security Council Resolution 1284 carried with it the birth of
UNMOVIC and a reaffirming of Iraq’s need to fall into compliance with international law,
namely Resolution 687. In January of 2000, “UN Secretary-General [Kofi Annan] nominates
Amb Rolf Ekeus to be the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC. The President of the Security
Council circulates a draft letter supporting Amb Ekeus’ candidacy. The Russian Permanent
Representative informs the Security Council President, by letter that ‘the Russian
Federation can not agree with the proposal’” (UNMOVIC January 17 2007). This sentiment
was echoed by France through a vetoing of Ekeus’ appointment. As a result, Hans Blix took
charge of UNMOVIC, a man who had pulled in some controversial opinion of his
effectiveness as an inspector.
Christopher Hitchens, author of the book A Long Short War: the Postponed
Liberation of Iraq, writes on the matter of Ekeus’ rejected appointment to UNMOVIC,
stating that “Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, proposed by Kofi Annan as chief inspector, was…vetoed
by the French delegation to the U.N…is it because Ekeus had a record as a serious and
committed inspector after 1991, while Hans Blix (the preferred French nominee) had
throughout the 1990’s certified Iraq and North Korea as good international citizens?”
(Hitchens 2003, 5-6). The reputed competence of Blix as an inspector runs under further
assault by Hitchens, who notes that, after 1998,
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the inspectors were reappointed and Kofi Annan…said ‘I think we should reappoint Rolf
Ekeus,’ the extremely brilliant Swedish socialist and diplomat who had run UNSCOM in the
90’s and had destroyed more Iraqi weapons than the whole first Gulf War had. Mr. Ekeus
had a proven record of success and a proven record of curiosity about the existence of these
awful weapons. Mr. Blix, on the other hand, had already certified Iraq, in the 80’s, as clean
and had meanwhile certified North Korea as kosher. The French vetoed and the Russian
vetoed the appointment of Rolf Ekeus…in favor of Hans Blix; don’t ask me why! (Hitchens
December 20 2006)

Hans Blix’s willingness to declare Iraq and North Korea as clean throughout the 80’s and
the 90’s is a detail very much worth cementing in the forefront of one’s mind when
discussion of UNMOVIC arises. The French delegation clearly wished to ensure that Ekeus
didn’t find a way to continue his inspections of Iraq. The suspect relationship between
France and Iraq is further explored by Hitchens, who recalls his anticipating of a meeting
with French foreign minister, M. Dominique de Villepin, and how he intended to ask, “is it
not the case that French policy is ‘all about oil’? Does not Saddam Hussein owe vast sums of
money to French conglomerates for past sweetheart contracts? And is it not true that the
last ‘independent’ policy of Jacques Chirac was the testing of French nuclear weapons in the
Pacific, regardless of the wishes of neighboring countries? Did not France also build a
nuclear reactor for Saddam Hussein, knowing what he wanted it for? Is it not French policy
that is ‘unilateralist’?” (Hitchens 2003, 5). Concerning nuclear dealings, Dr. Obeidi writes
more extensively on Iraq’s relationship with France, and his recounting will be addressed
shortly.
As with the French, the delegations of Russia sported salient interests in Iraq, long
throughout the ante-bellum process. In addition to voting against the appointment of Ekeus
to UNMOVIC, and against the sanctions put on Iraq during the 90’s, “Russian companies
have by far the largest share of Iraqi trade under the United Nations’ oil-for-food program,
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and Iraqi officials admit this favoritism has only one purpose: to buy Russian support”
(Sestanovich June 3 2002). It is clear that with these votes in the UN Security Council, as
well as the threat of veto brought to the proponents of forceful intervention in Iraq,
purchased Russian support was paying off comfortable dividends, according to the Stephen
Sestanovich, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of
international diplomacy at Colombia University. He goes on to say that “Saddam Hussein
has also offered Russian companies the rights to vast future energy development projects –
worth, Russians boast, as much as $60 billion” (Sestanovich June 3 2002). From this,
consideration must be made for the dependency of major Russian business on the
resilience of Hussein’s regime, which the 90’s saw to be under serious threat. Sestanovich
writes it plainly, arguing that “that’s why Russian oil and gas companies and major
exporters to Iraq want Mr. Putin to maintain Iraq’s favor by making sure that inspections
do not threaten Saddam Hussein” (Sestanovich June 3 2002). For now, however, the
international community in the year 2000 was stuck outside the locked Iraqi gates,
barracking for the recrudescence of UN inspection. Their wish would not be met until
November of 2002, with the passage of UN resolution 1441. However, one month before
the passage of this resolution and the reopening of Iraq’s doors to inspection, the United
States passed the Iraq War Resolution in October.

The Iraq War Resolution; October of 2002
Mired in ‘the dark years’ of no permeable intelligence on Iraq and having been left
with the heuristically provable desire on the part of Saddam Hussein to develop and
37

conceal WMDs, as well as evidence of these programs beginning to deliver returns for the
Iraqi dictator back in the 1990’s, the United States passed an act that would recognize the
American use of force in Iraq. The ‘Authorization for use of Military Force against Iraq
Resolution of 2002’ listed numerous reasons for intervention against Hussein’s regime. The
resolution states that “Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to
thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the
withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998” (United States Congress October
16 2002). This is a reasonably drawn conclusion from the stretched out history of Iraqi
noncompliance with international inspection. In depicting the specifics of what Iraq
possessed within its arsenal, the resolution argues that “the efforts of international
weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the
discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological
weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons program that was much
closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated”
(United States Congress October 16 2002). This is mostly in keeping with what UNSCOM
had unearthed in the nineties; however, the nuclear remarks must either be in reference to
the nuclear program that Hussein brandished before the Gulf War, or is guilty of
overstatement. Ever the perpetual tease, this paper will go on to discuss Dr. Mahdi Obeidi’s
experience in preserving the Iraqi nuclear program throughout the 90’s; but, in short, there
was little to speak of regarding a fully developed nuclear program prior to 1998. On the
nuclear matter, all that could be firmly established was Hussein’s palpable desire to acquire
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a nuclear weapon. On the matter of justification, two more aspects must be observed: the
alleged presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq and U.S. alignment with former UN resolutions.
The Iraq Resolution argues that “members of al Qaida…are known to be in Iraq”
(United States Congress October 16 2002). This concern would go on to be echoed by Colin
Powell in February of 2003, where he argued that “Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist
network headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associated collaborator of Osama Bin Laden
and his al-Qaida lieutenants” (Powell, Colin February 5 2003). The veracity of Powell’s
speech to the UN has been highly questioned, and for good reason. Most of the arguments
and evidential submissions made have either been proven to be fatuous or deemed too
distant from UNSCOM’s findings. As such, this paper will not grant them serious
consideration in constructing a security argument. One submission by Powell, however,
pertaining to the presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, would go on to be vindicated. This paper will
further delve into the movements of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi at a later juncture. On the
matter of UN alignment, the resolution prostrates itself before international standards,
arguing that
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary
means to enforce United Nations Security Council 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant
resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace
and security…in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it ‘supports the use of all
necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as
being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution.
(United States Congress October 16 2002)

This is a slippery and casuistic submission by the resolution, as this paper will go on to
explore the international legality of 2003’s intervention. In short, the United States needs to
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acquire a Chapter 7 authorization for the UN Security Council to legitimately apply force
internationally; this did not happen.

Resolution 1441; November of 2002
With the Iraq Resolution passed in October, the following month would come to
usher in the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which many have deemed to
be Iraq’s ‘last chance’ to comply with the demands of Resolution 687. Resolution 1441 was
passed unanimously by the Security Council, and adduced that
Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by
resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty
kilometers, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities
and locations, as well as all other nuclear programs, including any which it claims are for
purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material. (United Nations Security Council
November 8 2002)

Even more importantly, the resolution hints at the resumption of hostilities with Iraq,
“recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the council declared that a ceasefire would be
based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations
on Iraq contained therein” (United Nations Security Council November 8 2002). The UN did
not provide any guaranteed authorization of the use of force against Iraq in this resolution;
however, it effected great exertion in underlining a “final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations” (United Nations Security Council November 8 2002). This
opportunity would ostensibly be taken up by Iraq, as doors were finally reopened to the
international inspectors, four years later, now operating under UNMOVIC and Hans Blix.
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Mr. Blix, sporting the somewhat checkered record of having declared both post-Gulf
War Iraq and North Korea clean of weaponry ambition, took his team into Baghdad after
the passage of Resolution 1441 in November of 2002 and reported back with an update on
the 27th of January. He stated that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance –
not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry
out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace” (Blix 2003). This marks a clear
continuation of Iraq’s steadfast refusal to comply with the terms of the international
ceasefire agreement. However, Blix clearly lacked the same sort of suspicion that Ekeus
brought to his inspections, as he submits that “these reports do not contend that weapons
of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that possibility…they point to
lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must be
straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise” (Blix
2003). It is evident that Blix and Ekeus responded very differently to the unrelenting
stream of inconsistencies and vagaries that Iraq had provided the inspectors. Twenty-five
days after Blix’s remarks, the US had successfully amassed 100,000 troops on the KuwaitiIraqi border. On March 20th, the intervention of 2003 began.

Information Available After the Intervention

The Nuclear Question
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This brings us to the post-intervention portion of the study and an evaluation of the
decision taken by the coalition to remove the Hussein regime. Long since castigated for
both the existence of the war and the manner of its execution, the coalition deployed the
Iraq Survey Group, composed of American, British, and Australian citizens, to certify the
state of Iraq’s weapons programs. In the Iraq Survey Group Final Report, troves of damning
evidence make themselves known to the public record. The work of the Iraq Survey Group
represents the foremost international, scientific, and post-war inquiry into the nature of
Saddam Hussein’s WMD ambitions. The report states its overall conclusion: “Iraq
attempted to balance competing desires to appear to cooperate with the UN and have
sanctions lifted, and to preserve the ability to eventually reconstitute its weapons of mass
destruction” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). This conclusion fits nicely with the
previous spate of Iraqi violations throughout the 90’s, as well as with the conclusions
reached by Ambassador Ekeus. This desire for reconstitution was also met with certain
tangible pursuits of the weapons themselves, not merely the preservation of production
ability. First and foremost, one must address the nuclear question. The Survey Group
concludes that “by January 1991, Iraq was within a few years of producing a nuclear
weapon” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). This was unknown to the world at the
time, and any concerns were quelled by the assurances of Dr. Hans Blix.
The report goes on to state that “coalition bombing during Desert
Storm…significantly damaged Iraq’s nuclear facilities and the imposition of UN sanctions
and inspections teams after the war further hobbled the program. It appears Saddam
shifted tactics to preserve what he could of his program (scientific talent, duel-use
equipment, and designs) while simultaneously attempting to rid Iraq of sanctions” (Iraq
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Survey Group September 30 2004). It would initially appear as though the nuclear portion
of Saddam’s WMD ambitions was limited to one of production preservation throughout the
90’s. However, the rabbit hole continues, as the report states that “Saddam met with his
senior nuclear scientists in 1999 and offered to provide them with whatever they needed,
and increased funding began to flow to the IAEC [Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission] in
2001, according to the former Minister of Military Industrialization. Saddam directed a
large budget increase for IAEC and increased salaries tenfold from 2001 to 2003. He also
directed the head of IAEC to keep nuclear scientists together, instituted new laws and
regulations to increase privileges for IAEC scientists and invested in numerous new
projects. He also convened frequent meetings with the IAEC to highlight new
achievements” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). These numerous ‘projects’
receiving of Saddam’s investment and attention, long after the Gulf War’s final shot rang
out, indicate an illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons themselves, not exclusively the
preservation of production capacity.
The scandal continues, as the Survey Group concludes that “Baghdad reluctantly
submitted to inspections, declaring only part of its ballistic missile and chemical warfare
programs to the UN, but not its nuclear weapon and biological warfare programs, which it
attempted to hide from inspectors. In 1991, Husayn Kamil and Qusay Saddam Husayn
attempted to retain Iraq’s WMD and theater missile capability by using MIC, along with the
SSO, RG, SRG, and Surface-to-Surface Missile Command to conceal banned weapons and
deceive UNSCOM inspectors” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). Complementing its
programs and methods of nuclear concealment, Iraq pursued the long range missile
technology that was integral to posing the threat it wanted. Dr. David Kay, former head of
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the Iraq Survey Group, when interviewed by NBC’s Matt Lauer on the 27th of January, 2004,
undertook the following conversation:
Lauer: You found that in 2000 and 2001, Saddam Hussein did actively try to develop and
start a nuclear program.
Kay: He was putting more money in his nuclear program, he was pushing ahead his long
range missile program as hard as he could. Look, the man had the intent to acquire these
weapons, he invested huge amounts of money in them, the fact is he wasn’t successful. (Kay
January 27 2004)

This is not just a plain condemnation of Hussein’s post-Gulf War actions, it illustrates the
importance of missiles to Iraq’s nuclear ambitions; the same missiles that Hussein Kemal
al-Majid had confessed were one of the final crucial ingredients to Iraq’s nuclear weapon
program. These missiles were, during the ‘dark years’ of 1999-2002, pursued by Iraq
through an illicit relationship with the nuclear dealers of North Korea.

North Korean Missile Dealings
The Washington Times, writing on Dr. Kay, reported that “prewar Iraq paid North
Korea $10 million for ballistic missile technologies, but the deal was never carried out, chief
U.S. weapons inspector David Kay said Friday…according to Kay…Iraq began negotiations
with North Korea for missile assistance in 1999, with such cooperation continuing through
last year. Under the terms of their agreement, North Korea was to provide Iraq with missile
technology for 1,300-kilometer Nodong ballistic missile and other nonmissile-related
prohibited technologies, Kay said” (Washington Times October 4 2003). Revealed here is
the clear reconstitution of Iraq’s ballistic missile program, an integral component of
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Hussein’s nuclear desires. The Survey Group supports Kay’s statements, concluding that
“from 1999 through 2002, Iraq pursued an illicit procurement relationship with North
Korea for military equipment and long-range missile technology. The quantity and type of
contracts entered between North Korea and Iraq clearly demonstrates Saddam’s intent to
rebuild his conventional military force, missile-delivery system capabilities, and indigenous
missile production capabilities” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). This illegitimate
tryst between Baghdad and Pyongyang was not simply limited to missile technology. The
Survey Group makes it clear that “as the Iraqi-North Korean procurement relationship
matured, it broadened from missile-related projects to a range of other prohibited military
equipment and manufacturing technologies. Recovered documents from November 2001
describe numerous contracts between Hesong Trading Corporation, based in Pyongyang,
and the Al-Karamah, Al-Harith, and Hutten companies” (Iraq Survey Group September 30
2004). The long-desired procurement of missile technology during the 1991-2003 period
did not stop with North Korea, as many other countries played sizable roles in equipping
the former Iraqi regime.

Russian, Polish, and Indian Missile Dealings
The Survey Group, in discussing Russia’s involvement with Hussein’s weapons
programs, writes that “Iraq…signed a contract for the transfer of technology for the
manufacture of laser rods to be used in laser range finders. The Mansur Factory in Iraq was
to be the main recipient of this technology. Other contracts with Russian companies are
detailed in the following: The Russian Company, Systemtech, was run by a Russian missile
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scientist named Alexander Degtyarey. Most of the dealings with this company were
connected with missile guidance and control, and contracts were valued at around $20
million” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). It is evident that Russia and Russian
business were complicit in the attempted reconstitutions put to Iraq’s missile programs
and, by extension, its nuclear aims. This international scandal continues in Poland, as a
“Polish based front company engaged in illicit trade with Iraq played a limited, but
important role in Saddam’s efforts to develop Iraq’s missile programs. Equipment supplied
by this Polish based front company between 2001 and 2003, such as SA-2 (surface-to-air)
Volga missile engines and guidance systems, were necessary for the al-Samud-2 missile
program” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). This is a clear example of complicity on
the part of Polish nationals and their respective business; however, there is no evidence
linking these happenings to the Polish state. Moving on, several examples of Indian
business were similarly afflicted by this association with Saddam Hussein’s arsenal
development. The Survey Group concludes that
the government of India was not directly involved in supplying Iraq with military or dualuse items, but several Indian companies were active in illicit trade…[and] prior to the 1991
Gulf war, Iraq had experimented with the use of carbon fibers to provide high strength and
light weight for some of its missile components. Al-Rashid was instrumental in missile
development prior to the Gulf war and in the years that followed. In May of 2000 NEC
contracted with the Al-Rashid General, Co., to provide 40 kg of ‘Grade A’ carbon fibers, while
dual-use material, have extensive use in missiles and nuclear equipment. (Iraq Survey
Group September 30 2004)

Conducive to the pursuits of nuclear armament and missile development, India business
may well not implicate the Indian government in this debacle, but there is little to absolve
the Hussein regime in its maneuverings after the Gulf War.
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Saddam’s Chief Nuclear Scientist
Dr. Mahdi Obeidi was Saddam Hussein’s former chief Nuclear Scientist and was
subject to a particular assortment of terrors that that role came to provide him and his
family. In 2004, after the fall of Hussein’s regime, Obeidi was able to synthesize his
experience into an excellent study: the Bomb in my Garden. Within its pages, Obeidi details
the Hussein regime’s flirtation with nuclear capacity and how the doctor was forced by the
state to bury key nuclear components and literature in a metallic drum beneath his
property. He opens his book with clear condemnation of Hussein, writing that “Saddam had
always hungered for a nuclear bomb, and few in the West could believe that he was not
secretly trying to develop one” (Obeidi 2004, xi). This is a plain and simple statement to the
effect of Saddam’s unrelenting desire to equip himself with a nuclear weapon. He continues
with his unsettling disclosure of Iraq from behind the scenes. He recounts that “by the
outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War, we had succeeded in a key step toward enriching uranium
for an Iraqi nuclear bomb. The world came frighteningly close to finding out what Saddam
might do with one” (Obeidi 2004, xii).
As to the matter of Saddam’s post-Gulf War nuclear aims, Obeidi lends a decisive
viewpoint, arguing that “there was no active nuclear weapons program before the invasion
of Iraq [in 2003]. However, Saddam certainly had the capabilities and, it must be presumed,
the intention to restart it someday when the world was no longer watching him so closely”
(Obeidi 2004, xiii). This falls into near full agreement with the conclusions of the Iraq
Survey Group, suggesting that the majority of Hussein’s efforts were dedicated to the
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preservation of nuclear production ability, rather than the production itself. Obeidi may
well have not been privy to the Hussein-financed ‘projects’ that the Iraq Survey Group
uncovered in its report, or he would not deem these ‘projects’ suitable for concern
pertaining to development. As to the question of concealment, Obeidi is starkly clear,
writing that the components buried beneath his home
were probably the most valuable building blocks for WMD that Iraq ever possessed.
Saddam’s son Quasay had ordered me to keep them safe from UN weapons inspectors in
1992, and the Iraqi government concocted a story that they had been destroyed by the
security services…it is difficult to overestimate their importance or the danger they
potentially posed to the international community. In the wrong hands they could have
enabled Saddam or anyone else to quickly initiate a deadly nuclear weapons program.
(Obeidi 2004, 8)

This is a deeply important piece of expert testimony on the part of the man who was at the
scientific helm of the threat in question. Not only was Iraq concealing the ability to gravely
endanger the international community, according to Obeidi, but the ability to do it with
great expedience. The doctor concludes that even though Hussein was not actively
producing nuclear weapons after the Gulf War, he reminds us that “even during the dark
years, there were signs of a lingering desire for nuclear weapons. The most obvious is the
fact that Saddam kept funding the IAEC from 1991, when the programs ended, until the war
in 2003” (Obeidi 2004, 183). Obeidi clearly feels as though Hussein sought nuclear arms
and would continue to do so once the eyes of the international community were off him, i.e.
the discontinuing of sanctions. This paper will, at a later juncture, go on to discuss how
Hussein would aim to actively bring these sanctions to a close.

Nuclear Remnants
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However, with the illicit acquisition of advanced missile technology during the 90’s
and early 2000’s, one might walk away with the conclusion that Saddam could have begun
to reconstitute his nuclear program while sanctions were still in existence. Additionally, in
July of 2008,
the last major remnant of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program – a huge stockpile of
concentrated natural uranium – reached a Canadian port…to complete a secret U.S.
operation that included a two week airlift from Baghdad and a ship voyage crossing two
oceans…[this] was a significant step toward closing the books on Saddam’s nuclear legacy. It
also brought relief to U.S. and Iraqi authorities who had worried the cache would reach
insurgents or smugglers crossing to Iran to aid its nuclear ambitions. (MSNBC July 5 2008)

This story was syndicated widely, reaching the stations of CNN, CBS, and MSNBC, among
others. Hypothetically originating from clandestine trips to Niger, these 500 tons of
Uranium lend certain relevance to the idea of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program during the
sanctions regime.

Biological and Chemical Weapons Programs
To an even greater extent than it nuclear pursuits, Iraq’s many other programs
aimed at the production or acquisition of WMDs of a different stripe surface quite
frequently within the Iraq Survey Group’s Final Report. It states that “Saddam considered
WMD as the only sure counterbalance to an enemy developing WMD of its own. He said
Iran was the main concern because it wanted to annex southern Iraq. Saddam said US air
strikes were less of a worry than an Iranian land attack” (Iraq Survey Group September 30
2004). The biological weaponry pursued by Iraq during the 90’s is touched upon by the
final report, concluding that “Iraq’s actions in the period up to 1996 suggest that the former
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regime intended to preserve its BW [biological weapons] capability and return to steady,
methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the opportunity arose.
After 1996, limited evidence suggests that Iraq abandoned its existing BW program and
that one Iraqi official considered BW personnel to be second rate, heading an expensive
program that had not delivered on its potential” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004).
Whether or not the Iraqi biological weapons program was officially abandoned after 1996,
the Survey Group is convinced that its dereliction was not resultant of Iraq’s deference to
the international community or Resolution 687.
In his self-confessed need to develop the means to produce WMDs, Hussein’s efforts
had the potential to reach speedy actualization. The report states that “Presidential
secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, while a detainee, wrote: ‘if the sanctions would have been
lifted and there is no UN monitoring, then it was possible for Saddam to continue his WMD
activities and in my estimation it would have been done in a total secrecy and [with]
concealment because he gained from 1991 and UN decisions.’…in another debrief, [Abd-al
Tawab Al Mullah] Huwaysh said it would take 6 months to reconstitute a mustard
program” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). This disturbing information only
pertains to the production of mustard gas; however, the report goes on to further outline
Iraqi ambitions in the realm of chemical warfare. The report concludes that “Huwaysh
investigated and responded that experts could readily prepare a production line for
mustard, which could be produced within six months. VX and Sarin production was more
complicated and would take longer. Huwaysh relayed this answer to Saddam…an Iraqi CW
expert separately estimated Iraq would require only a few days to start producing
mustard-if it was prepared to sacrifice the production equipment” (Iraq Survey Group
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September 30 2004). The deadly implications of this are self-evident, as VX and Sarin
production would yield stratospherically high kill capacity for the Hussein regime. Not to
mention the unsettling idea that Iraq would only need ‘a few days’ to produce mustard gas
after the fall of sanctions.

The Obstacle of Sanctions
As with the desire to preserve the capability to mass produce WMDs of nearly every
form, Iraq went to a lot of effort to ensure the fall of sanctions, so as to ease the process of
weapons development. In studying the various techniques adopted by Iraq pursuant to the
eradication of international sanctions, the Iraq Survey Group concludes that “Saddam used
Iraq’s oil resources, in what Baghdad perceived to be a moderately successful attempt to
undermine and remove UN sanctions” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). The final
report goes into greater detail explaining the careful application of oil to swing
international politics into the favor of Hussein’s sovereignty, an important accelerator for
Iraqi WMD development that was effectively scheduled to take place. The report states that
the former regime played its ‘oil card’ in two distinct ways: first, Saddam either stopped or
reduced oil exports to increase upward pressure on world oil prices. Iraq successfully used
this tactic from November 1999 through the spring 2000. Second, Saddam attempted to link
the interests of other nations with those of Iraq through the allocation of OFF [Oil For Food]
oil and trade contracts, which were granted to companies whose governments were willing
to exercise their influence within the Security Council to lift sanctions. This effort also
included the award of oil contracts to individuals and groups willing to use their influence
with their governments to encourage policies favorable to removing sanctions. (Iraq Survey
Group September 30 2004)
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With such tactics in place, Iraq was doing what it could to bring an end to the international
farrago of sanctions leveled against it. This brings us to Iraq’s influence over other states,
namely Russia, France, China, and Germany.

Russian-Iraqi Relations
The dealings between Saddam’s Iraq and the Russian state, and its many relevant
businesses, can be classed as disconcerting at the minimum. The Survey Group’s findings
state that “the former Iraqi regime sought a relationship with Russia to engage in extensive
arms purchases and to gain support for lifting the sanctions in the UNSC” (Iraq Survey
Group September 30 2004). So how did Hussein undertake to induce Russian support in
the international arena? When pressed with this question, the following can be quite
revealing: “[in] March 1997…Russian Energy and Fuels Minister Rodinov went to Baghdad
to discuss a $12 billion deal in an effort to build economic relations with Iraq. The deal was
signed and was scheduled to begin once sanctions were lifted. [In] 1999…a Russian
delegation traveled to Iraq to provide expertise on airframes and guidance systems for
missiles. [Also,] under OFF [Oil For Food], 32 percent of the Iraqi contracts went to Russia”
(Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). Placing many oil contracts and a sizable amount
of money in the hands of Russian business and government was deemed by the Survey
Group to be a method of expiring international sanctions on the part of the Iraqi state. With
many of these dealings requiring the fall of sanctions to see their actualization, incentive to
have Russia combat international sanctions was clearly created.
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French-Iraqi Relations
As with Russia, France received wholesome attention from Hussein’s petroleum
enterprise. The Survey Group reports that “Saddam’s regime, in order to induce France to
aid in getting sanctions lifted, targeted friendly companies and foreign political parties that
possessed either extensive business ties to Iraq or held pro-Iraqi positions. In addition, Iraq
sought out individuals whom they believed were in a position to influence French policy.
Saddam authorized lucrative oil contracts be granted to such parties, businesses, and
individuals” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). From this uncovering emerges the
following question: how extensive were these dealings with France? In other words, how
much Iraqi oil was to be dedicated towards this program of influencing French policy?
While the summation of cost is difficult to estimate, the Survey does state that “the French
oil companies Total and SOCAP received over 105 million and 93 million barrels,
respectively” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). Adjusted for inflation, the oil priceper-barrel in the year 2000 was “$35.88” (Inflation Data January 19 2012). That comes out
to a total of $7,104,240,000 in Iraqi oil allocated to those two companies alone.
In addition to the Survey Group, Dr. Obeidi provides an internal perspective on
Hussein’s relationship with the French. He writes, “in the Autumn of 1979, I received a
written order from IAEC director al-Hashimi to travel to France and represent the IAEC as
director of the Experimental Group” (Obeidi 2004, 42). This was at the time of planning for
the future Osiraq reactor that was to be bombed by the Israelis in 1981. Obeidi writes that
“the bombing of the Tammuz reactor ignited an international debate about how close Iraq
had come to developing nuclear weapons and what should be done about Saddam’s
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appetite for an atomic bomb. Our French counterparts at Saclay argued on Iraq’s behalf
that the Tammuz reactor was unfit for the production of plutonium and that inspections by
the International Atomic Energy Agency and French technicians would have prevented the
misuse of the reactor” (Obeidi 2004, 52). It is clear that France has an interest in preserving
Iraq’s Nuclear Program and that the further development of this interest through the
acquisition of Iraqi oil is very much worth the mentioning. In light of these revealing
entanglements between Iraq and both France and Russia, one must keep these factors in
mind when observing former French and Russian behavior in the United Nations Security
Council whenever Saddam Hussein’s name floated to the front of the docket.

Chinese-Iraqi Relations
As with the Russian and French courtships by the Iraqi state, crosshairs were also
pulled over the People’s Republic of China. Carrie Satterlee writes to great effect on the
economic and political flirtation of both China and Germany with the Hussein regime. She
begins with a citation of the C.I.A’s World Factbook from 2002, noting that “China controls
roughly 5.8 percent of Iraq’s annual imports” (Satterlee February 28 2003). Continuing
with reference to Trish Saywell of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Satterlee writes that
the “China National Oil Company, partnered with China North Industries Corp., negotiated a
22-year-long deal for future oil exploration in the Al Ahdab field in southern Iraq”
(Satterlee February 28 2003). Additionally, citing Kenneth Timmerman from Insight on the
News, she observes that
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in recent years, the Chinese Aero-Technology Import-Export Company (CATIC) has been
contracted to sell ‘meteorological satellite’ and ‘surface observation’ equipment to Iraq. The
U.N. oil-for-food program approved this contract…CATIC also won approval from the U.N. in
July 2000 to sell $2 million worth of fiber optic cables. This and similar contracts approved
were disguised as telecommunications gear. These cables can be used for secure data and
communications links between national command and control centers and long-range
search radar, and missile-launch units, according to U.S. officials. In addition, China National
Electric Wire & Cable and China National Technical Import Telecommunications Equipment
Company are believed to have sold Iraq $6 million and $15.5 million worth of
communications equipment and other unspecified supplies, respectively. (Satterlee
February 28 2003)

Finally, she references the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] when
writing that “from 1981 to 2001, China was the second largest supplier of weapons and
arms to Iraq, supplying over 18 percent of Iraq’s weapons imports” (Satterlee February 28
2003). In light of this highly illegal relationship between the Chinese and Saddam Hussein,
one must cultivate suspicion over China’s persistent opposition to Iraqi sanctions and the
coalition’s intervention in 2003. The New York Times wrote in December of 1997 that
“China’s Foreign Minister said today that he doubted that Iraq still had weapons of mass
destruction and said that remaining suspicions should be cleared up quickly so that United
Nations sanctions could be eased…‘China’s fundamental stance is the opposition to
imposing any sanctions on any country for any reason,’ [Foreign Minister Qian Qichen]
said. ‘Despite the fact that we have not supported these resolutions, they must be
respected. But they must not be continued for ever. They should be eased gradually’” (New
York Times December 26 1997). These two perspectives on the Chinese position deserve to
be seriously considered side-by-side.

German-Iraqi Relations
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Satterlee moves on to discussing the ties that bind the former Iraqi regime and
Federal Germany. She begins by citing David Sands of the Washington Times, pointing out
that “direct trade between Germany and Iraq amounts to about $350 million annually, and
another $1 billion is reportedly sold through third parties” (Satterlee February 28 2003).
Continuing in her unveiling of international scandal, she writes that “it has recently been
reported that Saddam Hussein has ordered Iraqi domestic businesses to show preference
to German companies as a reward for Germany’s ‘firm positive stand in rejecting the
launching of a military attack against Iraq.’ It was also reported that over 101 German
companies were present at the Baghdad Annual exposition” (Satterlee February 28 2003).
Quoting Faye Bowers of the Christian Science Monitor, Satterlee notes that “Germany is
owed billions by Iraq in foreign debt generated during the 1980’s” (Satterlee February 28
2003). With the Hussein regime having been so thoroughly tied to the economic benefit of
Germany, one must incorporate this history into any understanding of German
remonstration in the UN Security Council when the question of intervention rears its head.
Satterlee’s coda on German-Iraqi scandal marks a new level of illicit behavior between the
two states. She comments that “an article in the German daily Tageszeitung reported that of
the more than 80 German companies that have done business with Baghdad since around
1975 and have continued to do so up until 2001, many have supplied whole systems or
components for weapons of mass destruction” (Satterlee February 28 2003). This bartering
history signifies a striking connection between German business and the Iraqi pursuit of
WMDs. To disregard these factors would be nothing short of flippant.
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The RCC Resolution – Rendering Sanctions Impotent
With both France and Russia registered as hopeful comrades in the destruction of
international sanctions, Hussein also indicated an intention to fully abnegate all UN
resolutions, to relinquish any attempt to win back international approval, and to charge
ahead with the reactivation of Iraq’s WMD production lines. The Iraq Survey Group finds
that “Saddam, angered by sanctions, inspections, and the Desert Fox attacks, unilaterally
abrogated Iraq’s compliance with all UN resolutions—including the 1991 Gulf War
ceasefire—with a secret RCC resolution, according to both presidential secretary ‘Abd
Hamid Mahmud and Diwan President Ahmad Husayn Khudayr” (Iraq Survey Group
September 30 2004). With this resolution, Hussein had revealed his proximity to
abandoning the hope of propitiating the international community. With willful rejection of
any international involvement in the Iraqi state, Hussein telegraphed the approaching
intention to begin his WMD programs regardless of how the rest of the world might
respond. The Survey Group continues, stating that “the RCC resolution formally ended all
Iraqi agreements to abide by UN resolutions. Ahmad Husayn Khudayr recalled that
Saddam’s text ordered Iraq to reject every Security Council decision taken since the 1991
Gulf War, including UNSCR 687. Ahmad said the resolution was worded in careful legal
terms and ‘denied all the previously accepted [resolutions] without any remaining trace of
them [in the Iraqi government]’” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). This resolution
is indicative of Hussein’s full rejection of conciliatory strategy, leaving only Hussein’s
preexisting desire to produce WMDs without consideration for international measures
taken against his state. Whether or not sanctions fell, Hussein was demonstrably ready to
pursue his weaponry objectives.
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The Present Absence of a Future Stockpile
The Iraq Survey Group also reaches the conclusion that now takes its place at the
heart of the anti-war movement. The report states that “ISG has not found evidence that
Saddam Husayn possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but the available evidence from its
investigation—including detainee interviews and document exploitation—leaves open the
possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq although not of a militarily significant
capability” (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004). This conclusion, while easy to
misperceive as fully indicative of blunder on the part of the interventionist forces, is
entirely compatible with the sequence of events reviewed in this chapter. Saddam Hussein
had no stocks available to him in March of 2003, as he had yet to deploy the RCC resolution
and was still looking to achieve comity with the international community before
reconstituting the rapid production (a few weeks at the fastest) of WMDs. It is clear that his
large-scale development programs were ossified after the war in 1991; however, WMDs
were later concealed from international inspection forces, as were the programs that
yielded them, full effort was taken to preserve the ability to resume the development of
these illegal weapon stocks, components of WMDs and their production methods were
illegally acquired through international channels, and all of this was conducted under a
regimen of vitiating non-compliance. As this process went on for more than a decade, the
Iraqi state made many attempts to unmask its batteries on international sanctions in every
possible way, particularly through the exploitation of its trade relationships with France
and Russia. What can be demonstrated in this chapter is not merely the desire of Saddam
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Hussein to develop WMDs, but that development of those WMDs was inevitable, if not
incipient.
On this basis alone, one can make several forceful arguments pertaining to the
intervention’s justification. There are many that regard the lack of an Iraqi WMD stockpile
in 2003 as representative of the greatest scandal of the war effort. To sample a particular
anti-war perspective, one can turn to writers Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis of
the Political Science Quarterly. In their analysis, Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq
War, they write that “a variety of possible misperceptions could justify going to war with
Iraq. If Americans believed that the United States had found WMD in Iraq or had found
evidence that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda, then they may have seen the war as
justified as an act of self-defense even without UN approval” (Kull, Ramsay, & Lewis
2003/2004, 570). According to this perspective, a justified war with Iraq can be seen as
inevitable, as the forthcoming reconstitution of Hussein’s WMD programs would be not
only found by, but potentially applied to the forces of the later intervention. It is here that
the prudent reduction of coalition casualties by forcibly preventing Saddam Hussein’s
weapons development can be asserted.

The Unique Dangers of an Equipped Saddam Hussein

Saddam’s Previous Use of WMDs - Kurds
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But what is it that makes a WMD-equipped Iraq so dangerous? Firstly, a turn
towards Iraq’s historical application of WMDs renders Saddam Hussein a threat to
international peace and security that is in no way theoretical. Human Rights Watch
comments on the Kurdish genocide enacted by a WMD equipped Hussein in the 1980’s.
They make mention of
4,000 destroyed villages and an estimated 182,000 disappeared persons during 1988 alone.
The phenomenon of the Anfal, the official military codename used by the government in its
public pronouncements and internal memoranda, was well known inside Iraq, especially in
the Kurdish region. As all the horrific details have emerged, this name has seared itself into
popular consciousness – much as the Nazi German Holocaust did with its survivors. The
parallels are apt, and often chillingly close. (Human Rights Watch 1993, Preface &
Acknowledgments)

One takes from this that Hussein’s treatment of the Kurdish populations in Iraq during his
reign can be easily classed as genocidal. Integral to the mass-scale implementation of the
Anafal Campaign (which takes its name from Quranic verse, pertaining to Surat al-Anfal,
which comments on plunder and the spoils of war) was the use of chemical warfare
throughout. The Human Rights Watch observes that “Halabja was exemplary collective
punishment of the most brutal kind, carried out in bald defiance of all international
prohibitions on the use of chemical weapons” (Human Rights Watch 1993, Chapter 3). It is
clear the Iraq’s possession of WMDs in the 1980’s yielded dangerous and inhumane results
within the borders of its own country.

Saddam’s Previous Use of WMDs - Iran
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Additionally, Saddam Hussein’s former stockpile of WMDs resulted in international
massacre during the Iran-Iraq war. A Global Security report states that “Saddam Hussein
sought to increase the war’s manpower and economic cost to Iran. For this purpose, Iraq
purchased new weapons, mainly from the Soviet Union and France. Iraq also completed the
construction of what came to be known as ‘killing zones’…to stop Iranian units. In addition,
according to Jane’s Defence Weekly and other sources, Baghdad used chemical weapons
against Iranian troop concentrations and launched attacks on many economic centers”
(Global Security 2011). It is clear that WMD possession empowered Saddam Hussein to
inflict considerable damage at both the local and international levels. One recognizes that
the notion of Hussein providing himself with more WMDs in the future represented a
threat to international peace on a conceivably greater scale. Dr. Mahdi Obeidi writes with
personal experience of the corroded interior of Saddam’s weapons development apparatus,
arguing that “in many ways Saddam was himself a weapon of mass destruction. He had
invaded two neighboring countries, killed thousands of Iraqis and Iranians with chemical
weapons, tortured and terrorized his own people, and buried many of his victims in mass
graves. For years his erratic behavior had proven just how delusional and sinister he was.
The idea that he might one day surprise the world with a nuclear bomb was a powerful
nightmare” (Obeidi 2004, xi). Here, Obeidi effectively depicts the non-theoretical danger to
the international community that a WMD equipped Saddam Hussein would pose.

Fears of International Destruction and Blackmail
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The Iraq Survey Group was, after the war, able to recover a recording of Saddam
Hussein in exchange with Hussein Kamel in January of 1991. The following is a brief
excerpt from that conversation:
Hussein: I want the weapons to be distributed to targets; I want Riyadh and Jeddah, which
are the biggest Saudi cities with all the decision makers, and the Saudi rulers live there. This
is for the germ and chemical weapons…Also, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you
should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center.
Kamil: Sir, the best way to transport this weapon and achieve the most harmful effects
would come by using planes, like a crop plane; to scatter it. This is, Sir, a thousand times
more harmful. This is according to the analyses of the technicians (interrupted)…
Saddam: May God help us do it…We will never lower our heads as long as we are alive, even
if we have to destroy everybody. (Iraq Survey Group September 30 2004)

It is not difficult to conclude from this conversation that Hussein not only sought out a
weapons program, but had plans of considerable violence against local states, such as Saudi
Arabia and Israel, in addition to his well reported and manifested hatred of the Iranians.
Hitchens concludes that “in the…case of Iraq, a preemptive war is justified by its advocates
on the grounds of past Iraqi aggressions and the logical presumption of future ones—which
would make it partly retaliatory and partly preventive…if no sinister weaponry is found
before the war begins, then the war is rejustified on the grounds that it prevented such
weapons from being developed” (Hitchens 2003, 45). It is adduced plainly here that
Saddam Hussein’s previous application of WMDs and continuingly explosive rhetoric
render his future acquisition of WMDs a severe threat to international security and
countless innocent lives. Hitchens also notes that
the speech from Saddam Hussein saying the only mistake he ever made was that he
‘invaded Kuwait before he’d finished the nuclear weapon, he should have done it the other
way round.’ First get the nuclear weapon at the Tuwaitha reactor, which we found as a
result of the Kuwait War when we weren’t looking for it. Get the bomb first, then invade
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Kuwait, then ask them ‘what they’re gonna do now, now that I’ve invaded it’…we lived at
this man’s permission for a long time, we lived by his warrant, only his stupidity allowed us
to be as complacent as we were; and in the meantime, fighters in Northern and Southern
Iraq were fighting against a tyrant who we should have been fighting ourselves. (Hitchens
April 4 2008)

Hussein had made public his great blunder of initiating the Kuwaiti invasion before his
weapons program had allowed him a nuclear capacity, he also made it clear that is not a
mistake he would make again. Upon being presented with these remarks, the idea of
Saddam Hussein blackmailing the international community could be deemed a probable
outcome on the basis of his less-than-comforting rhetoric.

Regional WMD Proliferation
In addition to the dangers of international blackmail and violence that come with a
WMD capable Saddam Hussein, there exists the concern of WMD proliferation to associated
terrorist groups. Pearson writes in his study of UNSCOM that “in parallel with the concerns
about the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to states, there has been
an increased concern that chemical or biological materials might be used by terrorists”
(Pearson 1999, 64). This opinion is furthered by Ashton Carter, Harvard Professor and
writer for Foreign Affairs, who specifically addresses the self-evident chaos and destruction
presented by the threat of nuclear terrorism. He writes that “the worst potential WMD
problem is nuclear terrorism, because it combines the unparalleled destructive power of
nuclear weapons with the apocalyptic motivations of terrorists against which deterrence,
let alone dissuasion or diplomacy, is likely to be ineffective” (Carter 2004, 76). It is clear to
even the most casual observer that the threat of nuclear terrorism seen through to fruition
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is an unacceptable outcome, marking the absolute zero in diplomacy, humanism, and
international affairs. However, the veracity of these threats is a different question
altogether. Thus, the question must be tackled: did Saddam Hussein possess allegiances
with terrorist factions that might have benefitted from the impending Iraqi weapons
programs?

Ties to International Terrorism
Firstly, Iraq demonstrated a lengthy and varied set of collaborators aimed at
attacking Israeli civilians; attacks which undermine the PLO’s efforts in negotiation with
the Israeli state, as well as taking the lives of citizenry. Sabri Khalil al-Banna, also known as
Abu Nidal, has numerous attacks attributed to his name, including the planning of the
Munich Massacre during Olympics of 1972. As founder of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, a
militant anti-Israeli group, he has been closely associated with many historical acts of
terror perpetrated against Israel. The CDI Terrorism Project writes a curt biography of the
man, noting that “in 1973, [Nidal] broke with [Yasser] Arafat, accusing him of selling out
when the PLO moved toward the creation of a Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Nidal was soon sentenced to death, in absentia, by the PLO for plotting to kill
Arafat, latter setting up his own Fatah Revolutionary Council as a counterforce to be also
known as the ANO [Abu Nidal Organization]” (Katagiri October 9 2002). It is known that
Nidal posed an immediate threat to not only the lives of Israeli civilians, but to those that
were looking to make peace with Israel in the form of a 2 state solution. As a result, Nidal
was equally threatening to the secular PLO and its many members. The CDI also mentions
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that “until Nidal’s death, the ANO’s ideological objective was to liberate Palestine via a panArab revolution aimed at destroying Israel. The organization comprises about 400
members plus dozens of Palestinian militia men, and is organized by functional committees
for various political, military and financial activities. Considerable support in the form of
safe havens, training and logistic assistance has been supplied by Iraq, Libya, and Syria”
(Katagiri October 9 2002). It is clear that the provision of safe haven for Nidal constitutes
an affiliation of Iraq with Israel-focused terror groups and their members.
As with Abu Nidal, evidence suggests that Iraq was providing shelter to Abu Abbas,
hijacker of the Achille Lauro in 1985 and murderer of Leon Klinghoffer. The Palestine Facts
Organization summarizes the attack, writing that “Italian MS Achille Lauro was hijacked by
four men from the Palestine Liberation Front…Muhammad Zaidan (Abu Abbas), is known
to be the mastermind behind the hijack…the hijackers held the passengers and crew
hostage as to make a demand of the release of 50 Palestinians, held up in Israeli prisons at
that time. The incident which gained much popularity was the killing of a sixty-nine year
old Jewish, Leon Klinghoffer. Leon, who was in the wheelchair, was shot twice by the
hijackers and thrown into the sea after the ship was refused to dock at Tartus by the Syrian
Government” (Palestine Facts 2012). Abbas would eventually be arrested and not charged,
due to his holding of an Iraqi diplomatic passport, which allowed his unobstructed passage
into Iraq after the hijacking. Hitchens writes on this, stating that “after the hijacking of the
cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean, an act of open piracy that culminated in the
rolling of a disabled man, Leon Klinghoffer, from the vessel’s deck into the sea, the
organizer of the ‘operation’ was apprehended and taken into custody by the Italian police.
But Abu Abbas was not inconvenienced for long. He was released when he was found to be
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carrying a diplomatic passport—an Iraqi diplomatic passport as it happened, though he
was by nationality a Palestinian and had never been accredited to any overseas mission”
(Hitchens February 28 2011). This is a forceful implication of Saddam Hussein’s
government in the sponsorship of international terrorism, as granting Abu Abbas the right
to represent Iraq as a diplomat constitutes a significant endorsement of the man. Hitchens
also reports that “when I went to interview Abu Nidal, then the most wanted terrorist in
the world, in Baghdad, he was operating out of an Iraqi government office, he was an arm of
the Iraqi state, while being the most wanted man in the world. The same is true of the
shelter and safehouse offered by the Iraqi government to the murderers of Leon
Klinghoffer, and Mr. Yasim who mixed the chemicals for the World Trade Center bomb in
1993” (Hitchens July 7 2005). It is clear that the Iraqi government has officiated at acts of
terror against civilians the world over, particularly when considering complicity in the
attempted destruction of the World Trade Center in 1993.
In addition, Iraq has presented itself as a cogent threat to Israel through the direct
use of terrorism. Kanan Makiya, writing under the protective pseudonym Samir al-Khalil
for his book, Republic of Fear, details the multitudinous horrors of the former Hussein
regime from within the country. In its pages, he lists the various structures of secret police
that Saddam used to cripple the autonomy of Iraq’s civilian population. He writes that the
“Estikhbarat, or Military Intelligence, controls most of the operation against Iraq or other
nationals resident abroad…the military attache’s office, say in London, is instructed to
provide regular reports on ‘nuclear, bacteriological and chemical warfare institutions and
installations, giving as detailed information as possible on their capacities and stockpiles’”
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(Makiya 1989, 13). It is clear that the Estikhbarat was called upon by Hussein for troubling
activities on the international scale, but what of terrorism?
Makiya writes that “the Estikhbarat assassinated Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef in
London…and provided training and logistical support for the Iranian London embassy
siege in May 1980. Their involvement in the assassinations of Palestinian leaders by the
Abu Nidhal group through 1980 is also likely. When the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) tried to return the favour to Abu Nidhal while he was undergoing medical treatment
in a London hospital in 1979, they could not get at him because ‘the Iraqis had turned the
hospital into a fortress’” (Makiya 1989, 13-14). These events, as presented in this
fascinating exposé, reveal a distressing culpability in acts of international terrorism, many
of which were directed at the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. He goes on to report that “the
Guardian exposed an agent of the Estikhbarat as having been the ringleader of the attack on
Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to London, an event that provided the pretext for the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon”(Makiya 1989, 14). Full Iraqi complicity is shown here in the
attempt to assassinate Ambassador Argov in 1982. Two things can be demonstrated, in
light of these examples: firstly, Rolf Ekeus was right in concluding that Hussein regime was
“a deadly opponent to peace between Israelis and Palestinians” (Ekeus June 29 2003), and
secondly, Iraq has a history of sponsoring international terrorism. This tendency, when
coupled with an impending set of WMD programs, illustrates a strong threat to civilians the
world over, and particularly those of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
Continuing with the question of Iraqi sponsored terrorism, one must turn towards
the highly contested question of al-Qaeda involvement in Hussein’s operational history.
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Jordanian terrorist and member of the al-Qaeda network, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has been
accused of allying himself and his network with Saddam Hussein, prior to the intervention
of 2003. The Senate Select Committee on intelligence issued a report in 2008 on the
veracity of assertions made by U.S. leadership in the run up to the intervention. Many
claims that were made by the previous government were charged as fatuous, as the report
concludes that “statement and implication by the President and Secretary of State
suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida
with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence” (United States Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence 2008, 71). It is clear that postwar evidence of a full
partnership between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein has yet to be asserted with evidence,
and that previous statements pertaining to a supposed partnership were given baselessly.
That being said, the report also concludes that “statements that Iraq provided safe haven
for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al-Qa’ida-related terrorist members were
substantiated by the intelligence assessments” (United States Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence 2008, 71). It is clear that investigations into the quality of purported evidence
from the months leading up to the 2003 intervention conclude the existence of an Iraqiprovided safe haven for Zarqawi and other al-Qaeda members to be accurate. The report
goes on to state that “intelligence assessments noted Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq and his
ability to travel and operate within the country. The intelligence community generally
believed that Iraqi intelligence must have known about, and therefore at least tolerated,
Zarqawi’s presence in the country” (United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
2008, 71). This cannot be overlooked, as the harboring of international terrorists that have
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self-confessedly dedicated their lives to endangering the West and American civilians
represents a potential alliance of highly catastrophic repercussions.
Scott Ritter, who, in reference to the 2003 intervention, submits himself as “opposed
to this war as much as one can possibly be opposed to this war,” comments on the actions
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, prior to the intervention of 2003. The substantiated
presence of Zarqawi in Iraq and the purported collaboration with Hussein’s regime in
attacks on northern Kurdish populations represent a significant relationship between AlQaeda and Saddam Hussein. Despite his virulent opposition to the intervention, Ritter finds
himself confessing the following: “I am perplexed by Zarqawi’s sudden transformation
from third rate Jordanian criminal into terror mastermind who operates inside Iraq with a
sophistication that is beyond his apparent means. The only organization capable of running
a sophisticated network of cells/operatives from the north to the south, the east to the
west, is the former security apparatus of Saddam Hussein” (Ritter December 20 2006). This
must be taken as it appears: an inconclusive, yet highly suggestive connection between preintervention Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda network. While the direct connection to this
particular terror group remains opaque, the matter of Saddam’s previous collaboration
with, support of, and invocation of international terror as a general matter is beyond
question. As a result, the threats of WMD powered terrorism, as mentioned by Ashton
Carter and Graham Pearson cannot afford to be only frivolously considered.
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Chapter 4: Just War Theory

Just War Theory sports a generous and enlivening tradition stretching back to the
days of St. Augustine, with a multitude of alterations and additions contributing to its
philosophical history. For centuries, its benefactors have observed conflict through the lens
of moral critique and determined how ethics can be suitably applied to the subject of
warfare.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides the definitive vertices around
which modern Just War Theory is built. They begin by advancing the claim that “just war
theory is probably the most influential perspective on the ethics of war and peace…[and]
has enjoyed a long and distinguished pedigree, including such notables as Augustine,
Aquinas, Grotius, Suarez, Vattel, and Vitoria” (Orend & Zalta 2008). This effectively
synthesizes the contributions of all these philosophical giants into six requirements that
define the very concept of a justly undertaken war. It is stated that “for any resort to war to
be justified, a political community, or state, must fulfill each and every one of the [six]
requirements” (Orend & Zalta 2008). In addition to our discussion of these requirements,
we will be exploring how a preventive war could qualify under its rubric. Jack S. Levy
describes preventive war as “a strategy designed to forestall an adverse shift in the balance
of power and driver by better-now-than-later logic…preventive logic has long been central
to realist theories of international conflict including Morgenthau’s balance-of-power
theory, Gilpin’s hegemonic-transition theory, and Copeland’s dynamic-differentials theory”
(Levy 2008, 1). The conduct of a preventive war is based on reaching out to stop an
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impending event of great catastrophe from taking place. Many have contended that a
preventive war cannot be deemed just, due to the existence of more time to pursue
peaceful alternatives. This paper will, however, go on to demonstrate how preventive war,
in the case of Iraq, constitutes a necessary defensive measure and is compatible with just
war theory’s requirements. Firstly, however, let’s take a deeper look at how Just War
Tradition landed with the principles espoused by Stanford’s taxonomy.

The Just War Tradition
At the time of Rome’s imperial decline, St. Augustine found himself confronted with
the notion of war as a just undertaking. Generally regarded as the father of the Western Just
War Tradition, Augustine split the question into two portions: Jus Ad Bellum (the right to
initiate war) and Jus In Bello (proper conduct while carrying out a war). As this paper
focuses on the matter of deciding to intervene in 2003, we will limit our focus to the
principles of Jus Ad Bellum. It is written that “the right to go to war concerns the
justification that a nation must give in order for it to have a moral right to wage war on
another. Augustine laid the basis for four main criteria” (Oregon State University 2002).
The four criteria for Augustine’s Jus Ad Bellum are as follows:
1) “Just authority – is the decision to go to war based on a legitimate political and
legal process?”
2) “Just cause – has a wrong been committed to which war is the appropriate
response?”
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3) “Right intention – is the response proportional to the cause? i.e. is the war action
limited to righting the wrong, and no further. When people speak of ‘mission creep,’
this condition is the relevant concern,” and
4) “Last Resort – has every other means of righting the wrong been attempted
sincerely so that no other option but war remains?” (Oregon State University 2002).
These guidelines set out by St. Augustine will come to heavily influence the requirements of
modern Just War Theory. With each passing philosophical figure, the requirements of Just
War Theory grow more taxing for the wager of conflict.
Upon the emergence of Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century, Augustine’s work was
invoked in matters of Just War, particularly in Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. Father William
Saunders writes,
“St. Thomas maintained that a war may be waged justly under three conditions: First, the
legitimate authority who has the duty of preserving the common good must declare the war.
For instance, according to our Constitution, only Congress can legitimately declare a war…
Secondly, a just cause for war must exist. St. Augustine, quoted by St. Thomas, said, ‘A just
war is apt to be described as bone that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be
punished, for defusing to mace amends for the wrongs inflected by its subjects, or to reborn
what it has seized unjustly…
Finally, St. Thomas said the warring party must have the right intention, ‘so that they intend
the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.’” (Saunders 2003)

It is clear that Aquinas has constructed his Just War Theory on the foundations of
Augustine’s. With an understanding of how Augustine created the bedrock of modern Just
War Theory, one must turn to Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel in continuing to trace
the history of these philosophical injunctions.
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Alex J. Bellamy in his excellent book, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, studies the
history of Just War Theory and how its demands have morphed. In his work, he comments
on the philosophy of Hugo Grotius, the famous Dutch jurist writing from the 16th and 17th
centuries. Bellamy notes that “in war…sovereigns are confronted with a situation where
failing to act might facilitate a wrong or let a wrong go unpunished. In such cases, Grotius
argued, the sovereign must choose the least evil option” (Bellamy 2006, 75). It is clear that
Grotius believes in the idea of a Just War and that sovereigns are compelled to undertake
them when the opportunity arises. In describing the novelty of this philosopher, Bellamy
writes that “Grotius attempted to deal with simultaneous ostensible justice by emphasizing
the procedural aspects of jus ad bellum. Just cause, right intention and proportionality of
ends play a secondary role to right authority and proper declaration. If these procedural
elements were satisfied, a war could be said to have legal justice” (Bellamy 2006, 75).
Grotius exemplifies a full deference to the foundation of Just War Theory provided by
Aquinas and Augustine; however, he has chosen to highlight which aspects are more
important in the decision-making process for a sovereign. Regardless of these differences,
one can easily see that Grotius has had his work significantly directed by the texts of the
Summa Theologiae and others.
Bellamy continues in his study of the Just War Tradition, depicting the opinions of
Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss legalist and philosopher of the 18th century. Bellamy begins by
arguing that “between them, Grotius and Vattel dominated thinking about the laws of war
until the twentieth century” (Bellamy 2006, 79). In discussing the beating heart of Vattel’s
philosophy, Bellamy writes that
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Vattel…agreed with the Grotian premise that the jus ad bellum was a largely procedural
matter dependent on the satisfaction of the rightful authority and prior declaration criteria,
though this did not entirely exonerate sovereigns from their culpability under natural law.
Vattel…considered both defensive and offensive wars to be potentially legitimate, with the
key criteria being that ‘the cause of every just war is an injury either already received or
threatened.’ (Bellamy 2006, 80)

The approach of Vattel to Just War Theory continues the trend of being built upon the
paradigm of his forbearers. All of the differences are argued within the boundaries of
preexisting concepts, such as ‘just cause’ and ‘rightful authority.’ It is only with the League
of Nations in the early 20th century that the foundation is challenged.
Founded in the wake of the First World War, the ephemeral League of Nations took
a rather shaky and violent blade to the moral principles of Just War Tradition. Bellamy
writes that “the League established a system of collective security. US President Woodrow
Wilson envisaged a system whereby aggressive war would be countered by the automatic
and determined opposition of all other states” (Bellamy 2006, 101). This system was put in
place during a period of significant post-war fallout, and the attempt to constrain the
capricious initiation of warfare was a regnant mentality. Bellamy argues that “the most
significant innovation was the requirement that states justify their decision to wage war to
their peers, who would in turn choose whether or not to accept those justifications”
(Bellamy 2006, 102). This was the introduction of an incredibly different idea into the
arena of Just War Theory. Bellamy espies a serious issue within this development, noting
that “the main problem with the League was that the requirement for unanimity meant that
a sovereign wishing to wage war only had to persuade a few others to avoid collective
sanctions” (Bellamy 2006, 102). This danger of introducing political maneuvering into the
Just War Tradition also works both ways: not only can a war with an unjust cause be
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initiated through political finesse, a fully Just War can be impeded through corrupt political
obstruction. This attempted politicization of the Just War Tradition carried on into the
structure of the United Nations Security Council, which determines Just Wars in a similarly
peer-review-like fashion. The legacy of ‘Just Cause,’ ‘Right Intention,’ ‘Proper Authority,’
and others has, however, survived alongside the politicized Just War structure.
This legacy is found to be fully codified in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The six requirements that it advances as an entirely mandatory rubric, with each individual
aspect needing to be satisfied, constitutes the most demanding edition of Just War Theory
in the whole of its tradition. The six requirements completely include the former, and
comparably less-demanding, requirements of Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, and Vattel. What
is omitted, however, is the international peer-review redress of the League of Nations, as
such a program holds the potential to politically obstruct Just Wars. Keeping the question
of ‘justice’ firmly rooted in the moral, rather than political, the current Just War Theory has
several additions that make qualification even more challenging. In addition to the
obligations of Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, and Vattel, the current Theory also demands
‘public declaration,’ ‘last resort,’ and other aspects to make achieving the moniker of ‘Just
War’ as difficult as it has ever been. The first of these requirements is, in many ways, the
most challenging and important to the idea of a Just War.

Requirement #1: Just Cause
The first of the six requirements is just cause. It is the most important rule; it is the
foundation for the other five requirements: “A state may launch a war only for the right
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reason. The just causes most frequently mentioned include: self-defence from external
attack; the defence of others from such; the protection of innocents from brutal, aggressive
regimes; and punishments for a grievous wrongdoing which remains uncorrected” (Orend
& Zalta 2008). Under essentially all the exemplary reasons given for a just cause, Iraq
qualifies comfortably. With Hussein’s impending weapons program, his previous use of
those weapons to crush the people of Iran, as well as Iraq’s own population, his ample
support of international terrorism, and highly pronounced threats against the state of
Israel and others, one can easily invoke the ‘defense of others from [external attack]’ and
the ‘protection of innocents from a brutal, aggressive regime’ arguments, particularly in the
case of Iraq’s southern Shia and northern Kurdish populations. The quality of Saddam’s
international and local threat was not just grave, but singular in nature. No other regime in
history, even North Korea (which does not maintain direct relationships with irrational,
and thus undeterrable terrorist groups), has attained this level of scandal and volatility.
Also, when considering the case of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the question of a direct threat to
American citizens cannot responsibly be neglected. Robert J. Delahunty and John Yoo write
on the application of preventive war in the modern landscape of geopolitical bedlam,
particularly in the case of Iraq. They argue that
there are deep and pervasive similarities between, on the one hand, a preventive war
undertaken to protect American or allied civilian populations from an emerging threat that
weapons of mass destruction might be used against them and, on the other hand, a
humanitarian intervention—like that in Kosovo…fundamentally, the aims of both the
preventive and humanitarian interventions in question are to uphold the ‘strong global
ethic’ against the mass killing of civilians and other equally catastrophic events. (Delahunty
& Yoo 2009, 847-848)
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In the case of Saddam Hussein, both the question of defending ‘American or allied civilian
populations’ and preventing further internal genocides, all in the face of imminent WMD
acquisition, are relevant factors to consider. This, in so many words, fully meets the
demands of the ‘just cause’ requirement.

Requirement #2: Intention
The second of the six requirements is right intention: “A state must intend to fight
the war only for the sake of its just cause. Having the right reason for launching a war is not
enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate.
Ulterior motives, such as a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or
ethnic hatred, are ruled out” (Orend & Zalta 2008). As one can only infer government intent
from what is officially declared and how the government behaves, one must first turn to the
language of the Iraq War Resolution of October, 2002. The very first thing to be read in the
third section of the resolution, marked “Authorization for Use of United States Armed
Forces” (United States Congress October 16 2002), is the following: “the President is
authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary
and appropriate in order to…(1) defend the national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and…(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq” (United States Congress October 16 2002). This is
clearly compliant with the proposed just cause and bases the use of force entirely on
international resolutions and the pursuit of self-defense. As with observing what the
government has stated, one can observe how it behaves. After the intervention in March of
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2003, the coalition forces sent in the international Iraq Survey Group to determine the full
nature of Hussein’s weapons programs, such as to certify Iraq as disarmed. This is behavior
in keeping with the stated intention of intervening on the basis of Hussein’s WMD hazards.
This process would go on to be further investigated by the Iraq Study Group and the
dismantling of Saddam’s programs would go on for years to come. There are many who
argue that Iraq’s luxuriant oil supply was the primary motivating factor behind the
intervention, the veracity of which would threaten the Iraq War’s qualification under this
portion of Just War Theory. We will go on to discuss this alternative hypothesis in a later
chapter.

Requirement #3: Authority and Declaration
The third of the six requirements is proper authority and public declaration: “A state
may go to war only if the decision has been made by the appropriate authorities, according
to the proper process, and made public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy
state(s). The ‘appropriate authority’ is usually specified in that country’s constitution”
(Orend & Zalta 2008). The best example of this demand being satisfied in the case of Iraq is
the Iraq War Resolution, which was submitted to the United States Congress and passed
legally and publicly in October of 2002. The resolution provides for the United States to use
force in removing the Hussein regime from Iraq. As the reputed representatives of the
people of the United States, the Congress’ approval of this war prior to intervention marks
a public and citizen-conscious process. However, there are those that argue the
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intervention constitutes an illegal war, which may well violate this aspect of Just War
Theory. This accusation will be addressed in a later chapter.

Requirement #4: Last Resort
The fourth of the six requirements is last resort: “A state may resort to war only if it
has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, in
particular diplomatic negotiation” (Orend & Zalta 2008). Firstly, one can make the
invocation of the 1990’s as Hussein’s failure to accede to all other attempts to certify Iraq
as compliant with Resolution 687 and fully disarmed. With the dark years spanning from
1998 to 2002, ending with the passages of Resolution 1441 that provided a final warning
for Hussein to comply, only to have doors reopened to inspectors that would still attest to
Iraqi non-compliance, the question of how much time remained before an Iraqi or Iraqi
sponsored attack on the U.S. or a U.S. ally became all-encompassing. To put it another way,
if the attempted ‘peaceful alternatives’ of more than a decade of unrelenting scandal and
non-compliance (which lasted right up to the intervention) were unable to qualify as
‘plausible’ methods, then one is obligated to consider the dangers of continuing the pursuit
of these alternatives, particularly now that WMD acquisition has been demonstrated as
imminent. A fine parallel can be found in Levy’s description of Iraq in 1981. He writes that
Israel’s raid against Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor on June 6, 1981 is probably history’s
clearest case for a preventive strike driven by the fear of a shift in the balance of power.
Israeli leaders believed that Iraq, led by a hostile and undeterrable Saddam Hussein, would
soon acquire nuclear weapons that would undercut Israel’s (unofficial) nuclear deterrent
and, in conjunction with Arab states’ decisive quantitative military superiority over Israel,
threaten the existence of the Israeli state. As Ariel Sharon (quoted in Feldman 1982, 122)
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stated, ‘For us it is not a question of balance of terror but a question of survival.’ (Levy 2008,
12)

The case of the Osiraq bombing is a pivotal example of a preventive war purportedly
undertaken for a defensive purpose. With Hussein feverishly working his way toward
WMD procurement, and the diminishing relevance of sanctions in impeding him, the matter
of survival, as proposed in the Osiraq bombing scenario, can be said to apply just as vitally
to the intervention of 2003. With Hussein spouting not just the same threats of deadly
weaponry, but the same bellicose and apocalyptic rhetoric, many in early 2003 were feeling
as threatened as the Israelis in 1981. This meets the demands of a ‘last resort’, as it was for
the masses of innocent people within reach of Hussein’s impending arsenal not ‘a question
of balance of terror but a question of survival.’
It is useful to take a brief look at some of the violent and belligerent rhetoric used by
Hussein’s Iraq. For the sake of brevity, we will limit the excerpts to some of the more
notable outbursts between the conclusion of the Gulf War and intervention of 2003. The
following are sourced to Air University, the educational branch of the U.S. Air Force. In
September 1994, in a state-controlled newspaper, Babil, Saddam Hussein asked, “Does
[America] realize the meaning of every Iraqi becoming a missile that can cross to countries
and cities?” (Air University October 18 2002). This threat suggests the future export of
Iraqi violence to states including the U.S. In October of that same year, a state-controlled
newspaper by the name of Al-Jumhuriyah wrote that “[w]hen peoples reach the verge of
collective death, they will be able to spread death to all…” (Air University October 18 2002).
Both of these threats can also be found in the following article from Laurie Mylroie of the
Federation of American Scientists, who cites the Iraqi newspapers directly for both threats
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(Mylroie 1995/1996). Another state-controlled newspaper, Al-Qadisiyah, wrote at the
same time that “[o]ur striking arm will reach [America, Britain and Saudi Arabia] before
they know what hit them” (Air University October 18 2002). The bellicose and threatening
nature of these remarks is self-evident. In June 1996, Saddam Hussein went on Iraqi Radio,
in the wake of the Khobar Towers Bombing in Saudi Arabia just two days beforehand, and
stated that “[the U.S.] should send more coffins to Saudi Arabia, because no one can guess
what the future has in store” (Air University October 18 2002). In the month following
Operation Desert Fox, Saddam stated that “if [other Arab nations] persist on pursuing their
wrongful path, then we should—or rather we must—place the sword of jihad on their
necks…” (Air University October 18 2002). In the same month, he once again helmed the
Iraqi radio, threatening that “[Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti] blood will light torches, grow
aromatic plants, and water the tree of freedom, resistance and victory” (Air University
October 18 2002). These exercises in psychological flexibility continue, as on the first
anniversary of the attacks of September 11th 2001, state-controlled newspaper Al-Rafidayn
wrote that “if the attacks of September 11 cost the lives of 3,000 civilians, how much will
the size of losses in 50 states within 100 cities if it were attacked in the same way in which
New York and Washington were? What would happen if hundreds of planes attacked
American cities?” (Air University October 18 2002). Nine days after the attack of September
11th, another state-controlled newspaper by the name of Babil submitted that “[i]t is
possible to turn to biological attack, where a small can, not bigger than the size of a hand,
can be used to release viruses that affect everything…” (Air University October 18 2002).
Both of these final two excerpts can also be found in J.A. Klein’s revealing volume, the
Foolish, the Feckless And the Fanatic (Klein 2004, 2). In light of these phrases and
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suggestions of pathological upset, one must take the combination of this aggressive
verbiage and impending WMD capacity into stern consideration when the question of
intervention rises.

Requirement #5: Probability of Success
The fifth of the six requirements is probability of success: “A state may not resort to
war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation. The aim
here is to block mass violence which is going to be futile” (Orend & Zalta 2008). The
satisfaction of this demand is fairly simple. Michael O’Hanlon writes in 2002 on the
question casualty predictions in the lead up to the intervention. He notes that
based on available methodologies, the likely numbers of U.S. military personnel killed in a
future war to overthrow Saddam Hussein could plausibly range anywhere from roughly
100, in the event of little fighting, to 5,000, in the event of intense if relatively short urban
combat, with total numbers of wounded about three to four times as great either way. Even
as broad a range as this is based on certain assumptions. Iraqi troop losses might be
expected to be anywhere from 2,000 to 50,000, with civilian casualties in the same relative
range. (O'Hanlon September 25 2002)

In determining whether or not these losses, as well as those that would be incurred
financially, were regarded as acceptable to the government at the time, one can only turn to
what the government itself had to say in the months prior to the war, and the fact that it
would eventually decided to intervene. As a result, one has to take the pre-war government
submissions exactly for what they are worth. In his interview with Tim Russert, Vice
President Dick Cheney stated the following:

82

I can’t say with certainty that there will be no battle for Baghdad. We have to be prepared
for that possibility. But, again, I don’t want to convey to the American people the idea that
this is a cost-free operation. Nobody can say that. I do think there’s no doubt about the
outcome. There’s no question about who is going to prevail if there is military action. And
there’s no question but what it is going to be cheaper and less costly to do it now than it will
be to wait a year or two years or three years until he’s developed even more deadly
weapons, perhaps nuclear weapons. (Cheney March 16 2003)

From this, what can be taken is the apparent confidence, on the part of the government, in a
pre-determined victory. As many have argued, time would go on to show that this conflict
would prove to be rather more costly than anticipated, in terms of both blood and treasure.
However, the war aims of Hussein’s removal and the certification of Iraq as disarmed have
now been achieved. The ‘probability of success’ requirement, regardless of how costly, was
met by the Iraq war.
Before moving on to the remaining Just War principle, both the ‘last resort’ and
‘probability of success’ requirements need to be examined in the case of WMD application
on Coalition forces. The Survey Group notes in its voluminous report that “several senior
officers asserted that if Saddam had WMD available when the 2003 war began, he would
have used them to avoid being overrun by Coalition forces” (Iraq Survey Group September
30 2004). This echoes the temporal concerns mentioned in the previous paragraph. It is
here that one can most forcefully demonstrate the just nature of this war’s being
preventive. If the war had not been a preventive one and had the prior regimen of ‘peaceful
alternatives’ during 1990’s and early 2000’s been maintained, the ‘probability of success’
aspect would have directly suffered due to Iraq’s impending WMD acquisition. It is argued
that choosing to discontinue the pursuit of ‘peaceful alternatives’ constitutes a violation of
the ‘last resort’ requirement. However, as was just observed in the ‘last resort’ portion of
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this paper, these ‘peaceful alternatives’ have to also be ‘plausible,’ which they definitively
were not. Thus, having the intervention undertaken in a preventive manner yields no cost
from the ‘last resort’ aspect of Just War Theory, whilst simultaneously reinforcing both the
‘probability of success’ and the satisfaction of our next requirement: ‘proportionality.’

Requirement #6: Proportionality
The last of the six requirements is proportionality: “A state must, prior to initiating a
war, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it, such as securing the just cause,
against the universal evil expected to result, notably casualties. Only if the benefits are
proportional to, or ‘worth’, the costs may the war action proceed. (The universal must be
stressed, since often in war states only tally their own expected benefits and costs, radically
discounting those accruing to the enemy and to any innocent third parties)” (Orend & Zalta
2008). In the case of casualties derived from the intervention of 2003, the predictions of
Michael O’Hanlon roughly fit the actuarial outcome, erring on the side of optimistic.
Wikileaks’ publication of the U.S. Army Iraq War Logs in October 2010 reveals the casualty
count of the intervention, including the question of civilians. The Guardian Newspaper
writes that “the logs record a total of 109,032 violent deaths between 2004 and 2009. It is
claimed that 66,081 of these were civilians. A further 23,984 deaths are classed as ‘enemy’
and 15,196 as members of the Iraqi security forces. The logs also include the deaths of
3,771 US and allied soldiers” (Leigh October 22 2010). While the comparison of casualty
levels between two scenarios could well be deemed morally frivolous, if not fully callous, it
is an aspect of considerable sway in Just War Theory’s question of proportionality, and
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subsequently needs to be addressed. Should the intervention not have happened, one can
turn to Saddam Hussein’s incipient actions to determine how disaster of another form
would have been incurred by inaction.
Had the sanctions regime continued, one could reasonably expect a parallel
continuation in the Iraqi lives that were being taken by the program. Ramsey Clark, the
former Attorney General of the United States was also the Co-President of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions. Clark has laid numerous criticisms at the
feet of the West over involvement in Iraq, particularly on the question of sanctions. “Mr.
Clark charges the United States of America and others for crimes against the people of Iraq,
for causing the deaths of more than 1,500,000 people including 750,000 children under
five, and injury to the entire population of Iraq by genocidal sanctions” (Clark November 20
1996). Other estimates of sanctions-related deaths do vary from Clark’s sobering figures.
Denis Halliday, former UN humanitarian coordinator in Iraq has concluded on “the pure
and deadly efficiency of the United Nations sanctions he helped oversee in Iraq” (Powell,
Michael December 17 1998), which are responsible for the deaths of “two hundred thirtynine thousand (239,000) children 5 years old and under” (Powell, Michael December 17
1998). Should this sanctions regime have persisted, one can only responsibly presume the
continuance of associated casualties. Additionally, one must take into full account the
previous utilization of WMDs by Saddam Hussein, the impending resuscitation of which
was becoming less and less dependent on the absence of sanctions, due to the RCC
Resolution.
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In light of how, according to Rolf Ekeus, Saddam’s WMD program was largely driven
by rivalry with Iran, one must look to the previous devastation of the Iran-Iraq War. It was
during this war that Hussein was able to use his illicit stockpile in a conflict where
“estimates suggest more than one and a half million (1,500,000) war and war-related
casualties.”(Global Security 2011) In another bout of genocide aided by WMD use, Saddam
further developed his threat credibility in the campaign “dubbed al-Anfal, or ‘spoils of war’
campaign, in which as many as 180,000 Kurds were killed” (Sinan June 25 2007). This
conflict in the late 1980’s is matched by Hussein’s post-Gulf War treatment of the Shia in
Southern Iraq during an anti-government uprising. In 2007, Al-Jazeera reported that “the
trial of 15 aides to Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi president, over their alleged role in
the suppression of a Shia uprising in 1991, has opened in Baghdad…prosecutors say that up
to 100,000 Shias were killed when Saddam’s military crushed the uprising” (Al-Jazeera
August 21 2007). With a running total of more than 1,780,000 deaths to lay at the feet of
Hussein’s prior behavior, and if one presumes the resumption of pre-war sanctions, Iraq’s
former track record of more than 3,280,000 unnecessary deaths since 1980 may well cast
the intervention’s 109,032 in a new light. Should Hussein have been allowed to rearm, even
with the eradication of sanctions, one must consider the potential for the retread of prior
genocide undertaken by the former Iraqi regime, as well as the likelihood of expanded
ambition, given the visceral threat displayed to countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and
Western states. Should sanctions have remained, the continuation of the exorbitant death
toll from 1991-2003 must be fully considered; and, with the introduction of the RCC
Resolution, there is little reason to believe that sanctions would continue to keep Hussein’s
WMD programs at bay for much longer. Regardless of how questionable the notion of
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universal casualty proportionality is in a general moral sense, it stands as a clearly satisfied
requirement of Just War Theory.
Should the war’s illegality and potential motivation on the part of resource
accruement not prove to be substantiated (these will both be discussed in later chapters),
the preventive intervention of 2003 would clearly qualify as a Just War.
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Chapter 5: Oil

The matter of Iraq’s immense oil supplies poses a forceful concern for the integrity
of a Just War argument pertaining to the intervention. If the United States sought to accrue
Iraq’s ample supply of oil through its hostilities, then this could be established as a
violation of the ‘right intention’ aspect of posited Just War Theory. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in its summation of Just War Theory, defines the ‘right
intention’ element as follows: “a state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its
just cause. Having the right reason for launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation
behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior motives, such as a
power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or ethnic hatred, are ruled out”
(Orend & Zalta 2008). Attacking Iraq for its oil would clearly constitute an ‘ulterior motive;’
separate from what the United States claimed to be its intention in intervening. Should it be
demonstrated that the United States’ ‘actual motivation’ behind the intervention was the
desire to acquire Iraq’s oil, the Just War argument will fail according to the professed
standards.
In order to be designated as the ‘actual motivation’ for intervention, the oil
motivation must not only be demonstrated as accurate, but shown to be fully eclipsing of
the Security Argument. This distinction was particularly well phrased by Robert Ebel of the
U.S. State Department, who argues that “the thought was ‘Why are you going into Iraq? It’s
about oil isn’t it?’ and my response was ‘No, it’s about getting rid of Saddam Hussein. The
morning after, it’s about oil’” (Ebel March 21 2005). This is a concise version of the burden
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of proof put upon two competing arguments for the status of the ‘actual motivation.’ If
plans for oil, including unjust and morally objectionable plans, are shown to be de facto in
nature, resulting entirely from the separate and superseding necessity of going to war to
eliminate the security threat posed by Saddam Hussein, then the intervention, according to
the arguments of Chapter 4, still qualifies as a Just War. If the oil argument is demonstrated
as the dominant motivation, rendering the security motivation as secondary, the
intervention does not qualify as a Just War.

American Control over Iraqi Oil

A Colossal Oil Wealth
As desire is, once again, near-impossible to prove outside of heuristics, one must
settle for a demonstration beyond any reasonable doubt. First and foremost, one can infer
desire simply from the fact that Iraq possesses an extraordinary amount of valuable oil. The
Brookings Institute, in May of 2003 reported that “over the past several months, news
organizations and experts have regularly cited Department of Energy (DOE) Energy
Information Administration (EIA) figures claiming that the territory of Iraq contains over
112 billion barrels (bbl) of proven resources—oil that has been definitely discovered and is
expected to be economically producible. In addition, since Iraq is the least explored of the
oil-rich countries, there have been numerous claims of huge undiscovered reserves there
as well—oil thought to exist, and expected to become economically recoverable—to the
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tune of hundreds of billions of barrels” (Luft May 12 2003). According to what was being
posited at the time of intervention, Iraq was seen to be a highly promising oil reservoir,
when relatively drawn against Saudi Arabia’s supply. The EIA claims that “according to the
Oil and Gas Journal, Saudi Arabia contains approximately 260 billion barrels of proven oil
reserves (plus 2.5 billion barrels in the Saudi-Kuwaiti shared ‘neutral zone’)” (U.S. Energy
Information 2011). The basic incentive to profit from the what were considered to be
immense resources at the time of intervention can be taken as evidence of oil as a
motivation to intervene in Iraq.

Dr. al-Shahristani
In light of Iraq’s sizable resources, one must turn to gauge the U.S’ success in seizing
these resources through the intervention. Upon the deposing of Saddam Hussein after
intervention, the newly established parliament saw Nouri al-Maliki as its Prime Minister. In
2006, Prime Minister Maliki saw to the appointing of Dr. Hussain al-Shahristani as Iraq’s Oil
Minister. Abu Dhabi’s The National writes that “Shahristani…the soft-spoken Iraqi oil
minister, a devout Shiite Muslim, is also reputedly incorruptible and has more been sought
after by men in power than a power-seeker himself. It is those latter qualities that in May
2006 led Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, to pick Dr. al-Shahristani for one of the
most important and difficult jobs in his cabinet: resuscitating the country’s ravaged oil and
gas sector to help Iraq realize its potential as a world-class energy producer” (Carlisle July
9 2009, 1). It is clear that Dr. al-Shahristani marks the most significant authority on Iraqi oil
and its future. From this emerges the following question: how much influence has the
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United States demonstrated over Dr. al-Shahristani and the designation of Iraqi oil? The
same piece goes on to report that “under intense pressure to reverse production declines
from big oilfields, the minister staked his political future on an auction of oil contracts to
foreign firms” (Carlisle July 9 2009, 1). The auctions of the same year in which that piece
was written (2009) constituted a near complete dividing up of Iraq’s oil resources by-wayof contracts that will last 20 years on from their inception.

American Contracts
So how did American energy companies fare in these auctions? The Guardian
reported in 2009 that “the American energy giant ExxonMobil today won the right to
develop one of the world’s most prized untapped oil reserves, in a $50bn deal that will
entrench the company as one of the largest players in postwar Iraq. Exxon was awarded a
contract to extract oil from the West Qurna reservoir near Basra in Iraq’s south during an
extended tender process that has seen the Iraqi government partner foreign firms in a bid
to get its reserves of oil out of the ground as cheaply and quickly as possible” (Chulov
November 5 2009). In addition to ExxonMobil, California-based Occidental Petroleum Corp
(OXY) has also seen to the purchasing of an Iraqi oil field. The company declares that “Oxy
and consortium partners Eni and Korea Gas Corporation, with Iraq’s state-owned South Oil
Company and Missan Oil Company as state partner, are redeveloping the giant Zubair Field
in southern Iraq” (Occidental). The oil business goes on to say that “Oxy and its partners
plan to increase production of the field – one of the largest discovered oilfields in the world
– to a contractually targeted production level of 1.2 million barrels of oil equivalent per day
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by 2016 and maintain this level of production for seven years.”(Occidental) From first
glance at the highly lucrative deals acquired by these American companies, one may very
well walk away with the impression that the American desire to accrue Iraqi oil has begun
to not only pay dividends to the businesses involved, but to reveal itself to the greater
public. With a scale along the lines of $50 billion a purchase, U.S. influence over Iraq’s oil
dealings and Dr. al-Shahristani deserves more scrupulous analysis.
Despite ExxonMobil and Occidental’s success, the totality of Iraq’s dealings during
the paramount auctions of 2009 yields a different image. In fact, the United States walked
away from the auctions with little-to-no contracts secured, holding the proverbial shortstraw. The international branch of Der Spiegel writes that “in the end, bidder consortiums
led by France’s Total and China’s CNPC secured contracts. Other companies awarded
contracts were from Malaysia, Vietnam, Angola, Norway, Britain and Russia. But there were
no US companies. Outside of the formal bidding process, only two US oil giants managed to
secure contracts for other oil fields – Exxon and Occidental” (Meyer December 6 2010). The
near absence of American energy companies drives a sense of uncertainty into the claim
that American influence over Iraqi oil and Dr. al-Shahristani is truly paying off, or even
existent at all. The piece continues, noting that “’No Blood for Oil’ had been a slogan used by
protesters against George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq. A SPIEGEL cover story in January
2003 even carried the title ‘Blood for Oil’ and analyzed Iraq’s role as an oil power.
Neoconservatives in Washington had always said that the money from Iraq’s oil would be
used to pay for the war and the reconstruction…but the opposite came true. A lot of blood
was spilled, but very little oil flowed for the US…The US spent more than $700 billion on
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Iraq, but now Iraq’s oil profits are going to other countries” (Meyer December 6 2010). The
matter of ‘Blood for Oil’ seems to be rather repudiated in the view of this piece’s author.
Similar sentiments found themselves spilling out all over the world media. Reuters
wrote in December of 2009 that “critics said the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq said was driven
by oil, but United States oil majors were largely absent from an Iraqi auction of oil deals
snapped up instead by Russian, Chinese and other firms. Iraqi officials said this proved
their independence from U.S. influence and that their two bidding rounds this year for
deals to tap Iraq’s vast oil reserves…were free of foreign political interference” (Abbas
December 12 2009). It is suggested in this observance that the Iraqi government has taken
the opportunity to use these auctions as a demonstration of independence from purported
US influence. The piece continues, “‘For us in Iraq, it shows the government is fully free
from outside influence. Neither Russia nor America could put pressure on anyone in Iraq –
it is a pure commercial, transparent competition,’ said government spokesman Ali alDabbagh” (Abbas December 12 2009). Clearly, the Iraqi government is eager to, at the very
least, portray these auctions as proof of their independence from external pressure and
illicit influence. This breaks sharply with the ‘No Blood for Oil’ mantra.

Surprise at the Low Level of U.S. Extraction
This form of reaction to Iraq’s oil distribution was fairly ubiquitous. On CNN, one
can detect a sense of disappointment in the voice of Wolf Blitzer as he goes over the auction
results. Blitzer addresses the viewership, stating,
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Blitzer: Critics of the Iraq war long maintained oil was the driving force behind the US
invasion, but the US is actually one of the biggest losers in the latest battle over rights to tap
Iraq’s lucrative oilfields. Who won? Get this: the Russians, the Europeans, and the Chinese.
Our foreign affairs correspondent Jill Dougherty is joining us now with more on this story. I
would assume the US has a right to be pretty angry given the trillion, maybe a trillion
dollars the US taxpayers have spent in Iraq and the thousands of American lives lost…
Dougherty: When you look at the contracts, you have Russia’s Lukoil, along with Norwegian
Statoil oil getting a huge contract, West Qurna phase 2, Chinese got contracts, even Angola
got a contract…what did the Iraqis say? Well they say that ‘this shows that business is
business’ and ‘we’re free from outside influences.’ In fact, today Wolf, I asked Secretary
Clinton about this and she’s putting the best face on it, she said, ‘what we think is important
is that foreign investment is back in Iraq.’ (Blitzer & Dougherty December 14 2009)

This comes as a clear surprise to a punditry fully saturated with ‘No Blood for Oil’
remonstrations. Due to the striking inability of the U.S. to seize anything akin to a hefty
portion of Iraq’s oil, the likelihood of the American government wielding influence over
Iraqi oil and Dr. al-Shahristani is substantially lessened. Additionally, one can turn to the
matter of oil-related Iraqi legislation to further gauge the actuality of purported U.S. control
over Iraqi oil supplies.

U.S. Inability to Influence Iraqi Oil Politics
The Iraqi Oil and Gas Law provides the means by which internal disputes can be
resolved from questioned deal-making with foreign entities over the matter of energy
resources. However, passage of the law has been impeded since 2005. In February of 2012,
Bloomberg reported that “the draft law, held up since 2005, may resolve a dispute about oil
revenue and sovereignty between the central government and the country’s semiautonomous Kurds that has blocked an agreement with Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM), Thamir
Ghadhban said in an interview in Baghdad” (Ajrash & Razzouk February 2 2012). The very
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fact that the hand of the Iraqi central government is capable of keeping Exxon Mobil from
tapping Kurdish oil is strongly indicative of the United States having no influence over Iraqi
oil. The passage of this law could well provide the Kurds with a helpful boost in their local
development, but Baghdad has been refusing to allow it for the last 7 years. The article
continues, reporting that “authorities in Baghdad have refused to recognize productionsharing agreements between foreign companies and the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Iraq was ‘weighing measures’ that it may take against Exxon after the company signed
what the central government considers to be illegal contracts with the Kurds, Hussain alShahristani, deputy prime minister for energy affairs, said last month” (Ajrash & Razzouk
February 2 2012). Whether or not Shahristani decides to take action against Exxon Mobil, it
is becoming increasingly likely that the United States is not in control of this process or the
Doctor.
Der Spiegel wrote in 2010 that “for almost five years, US diplomats have urged the
Iraqis to finally pass a national oil and gas law. The main aim of the law was to stipulate a
just sharing of oil revenues in the northern part of the country with the Kurds and to offer a
level of investment security to firms doing business in Iraq. More than 50 diplomatic cables
cover the wrestling over the law – but al-Shahristani continued to hold the US at bay”
(Meyer December 6 2010). One can only regard here a struggle between the United States
and al-Shahristani, who has refused to give an inch for the last 7 years. This does not
bespeak any sort of influence that the United States holds over Iraqi oil or Dr. Shahristani.
Signs of Exxon Mobil losing its grip on West Qurna have already begun to surface, as the
International Business Times reports that “Lukoil, Russia’s state-owned oil major, said it
was in talks with ExxonMobil to buy 37.5 percent of the U.S. company’s stake in Iraq’s
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southern oil field, according to Russian newspaper RBC Daily, citing unidentified
sources…since the U.S. company recently finalized an oil and natural gas exploration deal
with Kurdistan without the consent of Iraq’s oil ministry, the country’s threatening to
revoke its contract with ExxonMobil” (Bertrand November 30 2011). This is furthered by
the head of Iraqi Petroleum contracts, as another article shows: “Abdul Mahdy al-Ameedi,
head of Iraq’s petroleum contracts and licensing directorate, told the Wall Street Journal on
Monday his country could easily replace ExxonMobil’s contracts with Shell” (Bertrand
November 21 2011). Given the already paltry nature of the contracts won by the U.S., the
idea that Iraq could keep American drilling out of West Qurna and Kurdistan is not so
farfetched.

Iraqi Independence
This notable lack of influence over matters of great importance and profit for U.S.
business is in full keeping with Prime Minister Maliki’s plain statements on the question of
Iraqi governmental independence. Taking an interview with CBS’ Lara Logan, Prime
Minister Maliki makes his opinions on the subject of Iraqi independence perfectly clear. Ms.
Logan begins by arguing
Logan: Your country is being run on an American political timetable. When you hear people
in Washington telling you what you should be doing, how does that make you feel? Are you
resentful of that?
Maliki: Actually, I can’t accept that the Iraqi government is being directed by any authority
outside the Iraqi constitutional system. The Americans never issue any orders for us to do
this or not to do that, as this is a question of sovereignty, and they respect that sovereignty.
Rather, there is cooperation, coordination, and there are common interests shared by both
sides. Certainly we do tell them not to do this or not to do that, they sometimes recommend
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we do this or we don’t do that, but this all happens in the context of cooperation between
the two sides. (Al-Maliki June 1 2007)

The Prime Minister takes little time in his full renunciation of the idea that his country is
under external influence. His statements here are found to be entirely compatible with the
postwar state of Iraqi oil.

Subcontracting
There are some that argue the existence of another kind of profit that the United
States is extracting in Iraq; namely, the matter of subcontracting for the drilling of oil itself.
The New York Times begins with an addressing of the previously unsuccessful auction in
Iraq, writing that “the auction’s outcome helped defuse criticism in the Arab world that the
United States had invaded Iraq for its oil. ‘No one, even the United States, can steal the oil,’
the Iraqi government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, said at the time” (Kramer June 16 2011).
Clearly, the article takes a similar view on the matter of U.S. shortcomings in the previous
auction. However, the piece goes on to rejoin the notion that the United States will never
see a profit, writing that “American companies can, apparently, drill for oil. In fact,
American drilling companies stand to make tens of billions of dollars from the new
petroleum activity in Iraq long before any of the oil producers start seeing any returns on
their investments” (Kramer June 16 2011). It would seem that American drilling businesses
could well be smiling over the recent developments in Iraq, even the seemingly
exclusionary auctions of oilfields to foreign companies. The piece continues, reporting that
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Lukoil and many of the other international oil companies that won fields in the auction are
now subcontracting…‘Iraq is a huge opportunity for contractors,’ Alex Munton, a Middle
East analyst for Wood Mackenzie, a research and consulting firm based in Edinburgh, said
by telephone. Mr. Munton estimated that about half of the $150 billion the international
majors are expected to invest at Iraqi oil fields over the next decade would go to drilling
subcontractors – most of it to the big four operators, which all have ties to the Texas oil
industry. (Kramer June 16 2011)

Clearly, many American drilling companies stand to directly benefit from the intervention
of Iraq, leading to the opening up of Iraqi oil to the international market. It must also be
noted that the same can be said for all of the international companies that have purchased
oilfields in Iraq, as well as for Iraq itself, which has been able to more than quadruple its
Gross Domestic Product since the intervention (please see Appendix A). But does this
American profit demonstrate U.S. meddling in the system of Iraqi oil?
A few observations need to be made before this can be classed as scandalizing
evidence. First of all, it was firms like ‘Lukoil and many…other international oil companies’
that ‘are now subcontracting.’ Success garnered from drilling subcontracts is due to the
decision-making of the international companies that own the oilfields, not the Iraqi
government. These subcontracts do not suggest any US influence over the Iraqi state or Dr.
al-Shahristani. Could it be argued that the United States anticipated the receiving of these
contracts regardless of the international purchase of oilfields in Iraq? Would this suggest a
longstanding plan to profit from Iraq’s liberation? Presupposing that the United States
could predict the hiring of their companies to drill on the behalf of international business,
half of $150 billion in subcontracting fees just crawls past the value of the scant oil
contracts that the United States owns already. With Exxon Mobil’s $50 billion contract and
the Occidental, Eni, and Korea Gas “consortium to invest approximately $20 billion over the
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life of the 20 year contract” (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi 2010), a mere doubling of the
already insignificant slice of Iraq’s oil wealth does not constitute a formidable monopoly
over Iraq’s economic promise. As a result, the idea of ceding control over Iraq’s oil in
exchange for subcontracting duties smacks of a profound irrationality when the player in
question allegedly possesses illicit control over Iraq.

Oil: It was either not a Motivation or it was a Bungled One

In light of how the United States demonstrates next-to-no influence over Iraqi oil or
Dr. al-Shahristani, one must pull back to the following position: if the United States’ ‘actual
motivation’ in the intervention of 2003 was to profit from or control Iraq’s oil, then that
objective was entirely bungled. But how does one go about illustrating the United States’
original intention? This is particularly challenging when there are very few dividend
returns to point out. The Bush Administration has never formally stated that oil was the
‘actual motivation’ behind the intervention, and little in the way of documented intention
exists. It is useful to take a look at the work of investigatory journalism when passing
judgment on President Bush and his cabinet.

BBC Journalist Greg Palast
BBC investigatory journalist Greg Palast asserts that U.S. plans for Iraq oil existed
prior to the attacks of September 11th, 2001. When asked to give account on his accusations
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against the Bush Administration, Palast came out with the following: “the main spoils of the
war in Iraq is a seat on OPEC. It’s not just the fields; it is a seat on OPEC. What do we do
with that seat? The neo-cons wanted to use our control of Iraq’s oil to smash OPEC, to
smash the power of what they see as an Arab-controlled monopoly and Saudi Arabia.
Unfortunately, that also meant smashing $56-a-barrel oil prices, and the oil industry was
deeply unhappy” (Palast March 21 2005). Mr. Palast goes on to discuss how these two
plans for Iraqi oil control disputed the nature of future American action. This war between
the American oil industry and the Neo-Conservatives would alleged come to shape U.S.
policy in Iraq. In an article for the Guardian, Palast asks, “what did the USA want Iraq to do
with Iraq’s oil? The answer will surprise many of you: and it is uglier, more twisted devilish
and devious than anything imagined by the most conspiracy-addicted blogger. The answer
can be found in a 323-page plan for Iraq’s oil secretly drafted by the State Department. Our
team got a hold of a copy; how, doesn’t matter” (Palast March 20 2006). Let’s presume the
legitimacy of what Palast is adducing here, as well as disregard the reliability-level of his
evidence.
What was the answer that Palast found in his secret state department document? He
submits that “the system ordered up by the Bush cabal would keep a lid on Iraq’s oil
production – limiting Iraq’s oil pumping to the tight quota set by Saudi Arabia and the OPEC
cartel…Bush went in for the oil – not to get more of Iraq’s oil, but to prevent Iraq producing
too much of it” (Palast March 20 2006). Putting aside the actual existence of this plan for
the moment, one can quickly observe that if it was pursued, it was almost entirely
blundered. With the recent auctions representing “a bid to get [Iraq’s] reserves of oil out of
the ground as cheaply and quickly as possible” (Chulov November 5 2009), Dr. al100

Shahristani, in the success of his auction, has seemed to defy the central goal of Palast’s
proposed plan on the part of the U.S. State Department. Also, with the United States
spending the last 7 years in strident bray for the passage of an Oil and Gas Law, such as to
expedite the pumping of Kurdish oil, and the Iraqi government forestalling that process, it
would seem as though the U.S. has an interest in speeding up the extraction of oil, and the
Iraqi government independently wishes to cut the flow where it sees fit. Palast explains
that what the State Department had in store for Iraq was not enacted; rather, the aims of
‘Big Oil’ were primarily seen to fruition. He argues that “now we’ve had a new kind of policy
coup d’etat by big oil…and OPEC allies in the government. They’re in charge now” (Palast
March 21 2005). Presume that ‘they’ were, in fact, ‘in charge,’ one must still observe that
the paltry profits taken away from Iraq’s reopened oil supplies deeply discredit the notion
that these U.S. companies found success in controlling Iraq’s oil.
Palast finishes off his analysis of the oil question in the intervention with the matter
of Saddam’s overthrow. He states that
even before Bush was inaugurated, but within a couple of weeks, there was a meeting of oil
industry people, associated with Iraq, planning the overthrow of Saddam. An invasion
which would look like a coup d’etat. We would actually send in the 82nd Airborne and
replace Saddam, just give a new dictator his mustache, the Baathists would stay in power,
nothing would change. It was in and out…Colin Powell did not oppose the invasion of Iraq.
They were planning this from, like I say, the second week in office. Powell and the State
Department people were opposing a long occupation and a remaking of Iraq. They just
wanted to get rid of the top guy. (Palast March 21 2005)

Palast believes that the oil industry and the State Department had two different ways of
wanting to conduct an invasion of Iraq and for different ends. It is clear from the nature of
the intervention, and the public declaration of the Iraq War Resolution in 2002, that the oil
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industry did not get their ‘invasion which would look like a coup d’etat.’ Also, it appears
that neither party got want they allegedly sought out of Iraq’s oil supplies. All that remains
of Palast’s analysis of events is the matter of the State Department’s original intention to
initiate war to pursue control of Iraqi oil. Here, one is confronted by the idea that a preSeptember 11th decision to remove Saddam Hussein was undertaken by the United States
government. This is, however, not much of a confrontation to write home about, as it
became the expressed policy of the United States to remove Saddam Hussein from power in
1998 with the unanimous passage of the Iraq Liberation Act. Even if we presume the
legitimacy of Palast’s ‘secret document,’ the Bush administration’s plan for Iraq’s oil would
have to be created along the lines of and in the context of preexisting U.S. policy; namely,
the removal of Saddam Hussein due to security threat. When one observes the following
from the Iraq Liberation of Act of 1998: “it should be the policy of the United States to
support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in
Iraq,”(United States Congress January 27 1998) it makes perfect sense that Powell and the
State Department wanted to ‘get rid of the top guy.’

Tony Blair, Circa 1999
In addition to the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, the late 1990’s saw a more
international renunciation of Saddam Hussein’s regime on the question of his violence. In a
speech he made in Chicago, April of 1999, Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke
on the then tumultuous war in Kosovo. He noted that “many of our problems have been
caused by two dangerous and ruthless men – Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic.
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Both have been prepared to wage vicious campaigns against sections of their own
community…Instead of enjoying its oil wealth Iraq has been reduced to poverty, with
political life stultified through fear…one of the reasons why it is now so important to win
the conflict [Kosovo] is to ensure that others do not make the same mistake in the future…If
NATO fails in Kosovo, the next dictator to be threatened with military force may well not
believe our resolve to carry the threat through” (Blair 1999). The former Prime Minister’s
connection between Milosevic and Hussein is telling in-and-of itself. Arguing that we need
to build up the credibility of our military responsiveness to ‘dangerous and ruthless’ men
like Hussein and Milosevic amounts to a full consideration of military action taken against
the dangers of Saddam Hussein. He even goes on to illustrate when it is that we should
engage militarily with men like Saddam Hussein, arguing that
we need to bear in mind five major considerations…First, are we sure of our case? War is an
imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the
only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We
should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis
of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and
prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term?...better to stay with
moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large numbers. And
finally, do we have national interests involved? (Blair 1999)

While this list of necessities only loosely resembles the Just War requirements addressed
earlier in this paper, the comparison is striking. Prime Minister Blair’s discussing of
military action against Saddam Hussein in 1999 makes for a strong example of Iraqi regime
change being long telegraphed before Palast’s oil plans were even alleged created.
Incidentally, it is worth noting that former U.S. President George W. Bush was the governor
of Texas at the time of both Blair’s speech and the Iraq Liberation Act’s passage. As such,
reconsideration needs to be given to the popular proposal depicting the intervention as a
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strictly Neo-con event, and the other popular depiction of Prime Minister Blair as President
Bush’s obsequious helpmeet.

Bush Cabinet Histories
It is commonly submitted by skeptics and critics of the war that members of the
Bush cabinet had compromising ties to the oil industry. Former President George W. Bush
used to be tied to a number of companies in the oil business. George Lardner Jr. and Lois
Romano of the Washington Post wrote in 1999 of “his 11-year career as a West Texas
oilman” (Lardner Jr. & Romano July 30 1999). They mention that “Spectrum 7, his
exploration and development company, had reported a net loss of $1.6 million in 1985.”
Luckily for the former President, a Texan oil company by the name of Harken Energy
(HKN) was eager to merge with the failing business. “‘One of the reasons Harken was so
interested in merging was because of George,’ said Paul Rea, a geologist who had been
president of Spectrum 7. ‘They believed having George’s name there would be a big help to
them. They wanted him on their board’” (Lardner Jr. & Romano July 30 1999). In addition
to these two companies, the former President was also responsible for Arbusto Energy Inc.
“Bush organized his first company, Arbusto Energy Inc…in 1977 on the eve of a run for
Congress and quickly put it to use as a credential for the political contest” (Lardner Jr. &
Romano July 30 1999). None of these companies, except for Harken, secured a production
agreement from an Iraqi contract after the intervention of 2003. Additionally, George W.
Bush no longer holds a position in any of these companies.
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Vice President Dick Cheney’s involvement with Halliburton will be discussed later,
due to it being a more complicated case. For now, the rest of President Bush’s former
cabinet exhibited several ties to American oil business; however, the connections are
inconsequential upon inspection. Gale Norton, the Secretary of the Interior was “the
nation’s foremost custodian of parks, beaches and public lands [and] a former oil lobbyist.
Her clients included Delta Petroleum” (Mesler). Condoleezza Rice, the National Security
Advisor, “sat on the boards of broker Charles Schwab, insurance giant Transamerica Corp.,
and Chevron, where her name now graces a 130,000-ton tanker” (Mesler). Donald Evans,
the Secretary of Commerce was “chair and CEO of energy giant Tom Brown Inc” (Mesler).
Steven Griles, the deputy Secretary of the Interior was a “lobbyist for the American
Petroleum Institute, the National Mining Association and the Sunoco oil company”
(Mesler). This concludes the laundry list of Bush cabinet ties to American oil business.
However, concerns pertaining to Iraq can be dismissed on the basis of the following: not
one of these companies owns a production agreement over an Iraqi oilfield as of yet, and
these cabinet members have only been, at least according to the public record, previously
associated with these companies.
Harken Energy, the former Bush oil company, has secured a contract in Northern
Iraq. The Kurdish Regional Government writes of the “award of the Sarsang Block (1,226
square kilometers) in Dohuk Governorate to HKN Energy Ltd, a Hillwood International
Energy company. The Sarsang Block is considered to be a medium exploration risk area”
(Kurdistan Regional Government November 12 2007). With unproven ground that does not
even halve the size of West Qurna 1 (Exxon Mobil’s territory) and a troubling relationship
between the Kurdish regional government and Baghdad, this contract is not indicative of
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American dominance over Iraqi oil throughout the country. Additionally, the contract itself
makes an interesting stipulation on the point of subcontracting, stating that “the contractor
shall give priority to Subcontractors from the Kurdistan Region and other parts of Iraq”
(Kurdistan Regional Government June 11 2007, 52). This is a clear display of Iraqi
government pushing against an American monopoly over drilling on the behalf of other
international oil companies. This is yet another example of how the United States lacks
influence over Iraq’s oil governance. Also, according to the official Harken Energy website,
George W. Bush no longer keeps a place in the company’s directorship (Harken 2008). This
contract fails to establish the United States as the dominant player in Iraqi oil management
today.
Former Vice President Dick Cheney has been repeatedly tied to Halliburton and
their profits from the intervention. For the sake of brevity, let’s presume these accusations
to be true and that Cheney maintained an illicit relationship with Halliburton. In the case of
under the table maneuvering, would Halliburton’s profits from the Iraq War indicate
American control over Iraqi oil? Also, would it indicate that profiting monetarily from
intervention was the ‘actual motivation’ for warfare? The two sources of profit from the
intervention that Halliburton has come to be known for capitalizing on are as follows: the
repairing of Iraq’s oil infrastructure, and subcontracted drilling. In the same piece on
subcontracting that warned of scandal, it is written that “Lukoil and many of the other
international oil companies that won fields in the auction are now subcontracting mostly
with the four largely American oil services companies that are global leaders in their field:
Halliburton, Baker Hughes, Weatherford International, and Schlumberger. Those four have
won the largest portion of the subcontracts to drill for oil, build wells and refurbish old
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equipment” (Kramer June 16 2011). The question of subcontracting for drilling has already
been refuted in this paper, so it will not be explored further here. On the matter of
infrastructure, “Halliburton’s Co.’s U.S. government contract to make emergency repairs to
Iraq’s oil infrastructure extends for two years, could be worth as much as $7 billion”
(Gongloff April 11 2003). Even if Cheney profited illegally from this contract, and other
Halliburton adventures in Iraq, these events do not impact the resolve of the United States
Congress that passed both the Iraq War Resolution and the Iraq Liberation Act. These
events, scandalous as they could well be, in no way impede the salience and persuasiveness
of Saddam’s threat to global security. If fact, any illicit dealings undertaken by the Bush
cabinet are irrelevant to the question of ‘actual motivation,’ as this motivation was
determined in 1998, within the context of another administration, and then reapproved by
the Congress in the months leading up to the war.

Impact on Just War Requirements?
In conclusion, the evidence suggesting that the ‘actual motivation’ for the
intervention was monetary profit is distinctly hampered by the timeline of events. While a
strong case could be made for underhanded war-profiteering in the case of Halliburton, all
involvement of Cheney, in the case of guilt, would be classed as responsive to a preexisting
environment of established threat posed by Saddam Hussein. The policy to remove the
former Iraqi regime had already been undertaken during the Clinton Administration. With
the Operation Desert Fox bombings and the creation of UNMOVIC during the ‘dark years,’
the congressional approval of military action in 2002, and then the passage of UNSC
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Resolution 1441 failing to bring Iraq into compliance, the attempts to diffuse Saddam
Hussein as a threat without resorting to large-scale intervention were depleting long
before Cheney would have begun his alleged, opportunistic maneuverings. While one could
certainly point to Halliburton, Palast’s incriminating oil plans, the United States’ well
known hegemonic and resource-driven history, and the fact that Iraq possesses an
immense amount of highly valuable oil as highly suggestive of illegal, morally
unpardonable, and coldly opportunistic dealings on the part of the United States, they
submit themselves as later advantage being taken of an ‘actual motivation’ that was in
place long before the Bush Administration.
In contrast, what evidence is there to suggest that intervention was not undertaken
for profit? First and foremost, when one relatively considers the exorbitance of Iraqi oil
wealth, the United States yielded little-to-no monetary return on their ‘investment.’ With
Iraqi oil primarily being channeled to international companies, many of whom represent
countries opposing the intervention (Russia, China, etc), and many examples
demonstrating the nonexistence of U.S. influence over how that oil is channeled and
managed (the Oil and Gas Law, threats made against Exxon Mobil’s contract in West Qurna,
contractual inducements to favor Iraqi subcontractors, testimony of Iraq’s leadership, etc),
Iraq has shown itself to be independent in the matter of its resources. This independence,
also, has been maintained in the face of imploring and remonstration from American
business. These examples point to a case where the salience and historically singular
nature of Saddam’s threat constituted the ‘actual motivation’ for intervention, with the
accruement of valuable resources, if it is to be assumed as verifiable, falling to a secondary
or tertiary level of priority. Thus, the Iraq War remains a just one.
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Chapter 6: Legality

One might think of the legal aspect of the Iraq War to be rather cumbersome and
labyrinthine. However, the case of the 2003 intervention is actually quite simple at the
international level, with the domestic question proving to be somewhat more challenging.
This chapter will take a look at the war’s legality and whether or not that legality has any
bearing on its status as a Just War.
The matter of the law and its ambit clearly needs to be considered when discussing
Iraq in the context of Just War Theory. Former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter submits a
compelling argument for the illegality of the intervention. He adduces that
we went to war, a war…that was about weapons of mass destruction, this is a fact that is put
forward in the letter sent by John Negroponte…then the U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations to the Security Council, saying that American troops have entered Iraq because Iraq
has failed to comply with its obligation to disarm and that international law dictates that
America takes the lead in responding to this crime. Well, ladies and gentlemen, international
law dictated no such thing. International law dictated that the Security Council remain
seized of the event, that the Security Council would once again have to pass a Chapter 7
resolution, which it did not. The United States invaded Iraq in violation of international law
but, more importantly, in violation of the Constitution of the United States of America,
Article 6 of which is quite clear: that when the United States of America enters into a treaty
or international obligation that’s been ratified by two-thirds the United States Senate, that is
the Supreme Law of the land. Our troops took an oath to uphold and defend that
constitution, and yet they went to war in violation of that constitution. (Ritter December 20
2006)

There is a lot to be said for this objection and this chapter will look into how such
accusations impact the intervention’s standing when the principles of Just War Theory are
considered, particularly the matter of ‘proper authority and public declaration.’ In brief, the
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intervention was indeed an internationally illegal war that could qualify as an
unconstitutional act; however, it remains a Just War.

The Demands of International Law
Mary Ellen O’Connell writes extensively about international law, particularly on the
legal stipulations of the UN Charter, to which the United States is a signatory. She notes in
the opening of her terrific book, International Law and the Use of Force,
Perhaps not surprisingly, the term ‘war’ fell out of use as a legal term of art with the
adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945. The Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibits all uses
of force, war and lesser actions, except in self-defense or as mandated by the Security
Council. Article 2(4) of the Charter requires that ‘all Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.’ (O'Connell 2009, 7)

As a member of the United Nations, the United States is subject to the terms of this Charter,
particularly this article. Any cursory reading of the document will reveal that the text of the
UN Charter clearly restricts the use of force to either Security Council approval or, as Chap
7 of the Charter itself says, “self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member”
(United Nations 1945, Article 51). It is the case that any use of force falling outside of these
two contingencies is deemed illegal by international standards.
Additionally, the previous remark of John Negroponte that intervention was based
on security can also describe the British stance. In his letter to the president of the Security
Council, sent just before the intervention, Jeremy Greenstock, the UK ambassador to the
UN, wrote,
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I have the honour to inform you on behalf of my Government that the Armed Forces of the
United Kingdom—in association with those of the United States and Australia—engaged in
military action in Iraq on 20 March 2003. The action is continuing…the objective of the
action is to secure compliance by Iraq with its disarmament obligations as laid down by the
Council. All military action will be limited to the minimum measures necessary to secure
this objective. (O'Connell 2009, 83)

On the basis of what was said before the intervention, the officially stated motivations of
the United States and the United Kingdom were congruent, with both matching the
formerly posited ‘actual motivation’ nicely.

The International Illegality of Intervention
In the case of the intervention of 2003, neither a direct, self-defensive response nor
a Security Council Resolution gave the movements of the coalition their blessing. O’Connell
cites an article from the New York Times that, in turn, cites former Secretary General Kofi
Annan, writing that as he was “responding to a question on the United Nations Charter, Mr.
Annan said the charter is ‘very clear on circumstances under which force can be used. If the
U.S. and others were to go outside the council and take military action, it would not be in
conformity with the charter” (O'Connell 2009, 68). It is clear from even the most casual
analysis that the Iraq War was an internationally unsanctioned and illegal act; however,
there are some that attempt to dispute the Secretary General’s assessment. O’Connell cites
one of these dissidents from the same article: “’I just disagree with the secretary general’s
legal view because there are fundamental Security Council resolutions that underlie this,’
said Ruth Wedgwood, professor of international law at Johns Hopkins University”
(O'Connell 2009, 68). For the sake of considering Ms. Wedgwood’s opinion, one must
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appreciate the highly disapproving language of previous SC Resolutions on the matter of
Iraq’s non-compliance. However, not one of them mandates or legitimizes the use of force
against Saddam Hussein. On a point like this, there is very little room for disputation.

An Unconstitutional War?
O”Connell, in citing yet another New York Times articles, describes the days leading
up to the war. “Mr. Bush had given Mr. Hussein and members of his family until shortly
after 8 p.m. today (March 20, 2003) to leave the country in order to forestall an Americanled attack. But there was no discernible sign that the Iraqi leader was even thinking of
leaving, despite an offer of asylum from Bahrain” (O'Connell 2009, 79). With the last
peaceful measure exhausted before large-scale intervention, the American soldiery crossed
the Kuwaiti border and pressed on to Baghdad. With these American troops having sworn
allegiance to the U.S. constitution, the matter of the war’s constitutionality is highly
important. It is entirely true to say that signed treaties become domestic law, according to
the Constitution. Article 6 notes that “all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding” (United States 1787). Upon first reading of this Article, one may
very well walk away with the immediate notion that violation of the UN Charter constitutes
a violation of the Constitution in every case. This may have the potential of jeopardizing the
‘proper authority’ aspect of Just War Theory.
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However, one must take into full account that Congress passed a resolution fully
legalizing the intervention. Thus, it becomes a question of which supersedes the other: the
treaty or the Congressional law? For the sake of quickly addressing the matter of Just War,
the ‘proper authority’ aspect dictates that “a state may go to war only if the decision has
been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process, and made
public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). The ‘appropriate authority’ is
usually specified in that country’s constitution” (Orend & Zalta 2008). The Constitutionally
nominated body, or ‘appropriate authority’ for declaring war is clearly outlined in Article 1,
which states that “the Congress shall have Power…To declare War, grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water” (United States
September 17 1787). It is plainly evident that Congress is the ‘appropriate authority’ that
Just War Theory is referencing in the public declaration of war. Thus, there is no question
that the intervention’s adherence to Just War Theory is not threatened by the UN Charter.
Since Congress is the proper authority, Congress’ approval makes this a Just War.

Judicial Precedence
For the sake of scrupulous observance, however, one would be well advised to turn
to the judicial precedent set by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York on the matter of Congressional statutes and treaties coming to butt heads. In the
case of United States of America, Plaintiff, v. The Palestine Liberation Organization, et al.,
Defendants in 1988, this question was decisively addressed. Justice Edmund L. Palmieri, in
giving the Court’s opinion writes that “only where a treaty is irreconcilable with a later
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enacted statute and Congress has clearly evinced an intent to supersede a treaty by
enacting a statute does the later enacted statute take precedence” (U.S. NY District Court
1988). While the Iraq War Resolution is clearly irreconcilable with the UN Charter, it does
not explicitly state that it seeks to supersede it. While it could be taken from inference that
the very nature of the Iraq War Resolution aims to supersede the restrictions of the UN
Charter, the Resolution makes no explicit mention of the Charter and could be seen as an
unconstitutional piece of legislation. In either case, Congress still holds the status as the
‘appropriate authority’ to declare war, which it indubitably did. As a result, the intervention
still holds to the standards of Just War Theory.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions

When popular opinion is consulted, the notion of classing the Iraq War as just
emerges as farfetched and hysterical. However, when one considers the history of the Just
War Tradition, and how it impacts the critique of this conflict, certain revelations cannot be
ignored.
The pillars of Just War Theory span many subjects on the question of jus ad bellum,
aiming to debar all potential for self-service and caprice from legitimate conflicts. The
teachings of figures like Aquinas, Augustine, and others have outlined a formidable rubric
for the evaluation of warfare when the question of proper conduct is opened up for
examination.
This rubric, however, was severely compromised by the establishment of the League
of Nations and its hijacking of the Just War Tradition. The League of Nations introduced the
concept of peer-review into the Just War Principles, which dispensed with the moral aspect
of just war entirely. Two potential outcomes are born from this development: first, the
possibility for a wholly amoral war to be legitimized simply by the presence of an illicit
international consensus; and second, the possibility for a morally just war to be obstructed
by politically corrupt international maneuverings. This evacuation of the moral dimension
from Just War Tradition was passed on from the League of Nations and has come to define
the decision-making process of the United Nations, where the Permanent 5 of the Security
Council [United States, France, Great Britain, China, and Russia] hold significant peer115

review sway. Alongside these institutions, however, the moral tradition of Just War Theory
has also survived, with the scholarship described in Chapter 4 providing the most modern
and demanding set of Just War principles in the tradition. There is good reason why the
element of international peer-review is absent from these principles.
In this paper, we have discussed the nature of Saddam Hussein’s aspiring weapons
program, the distressing proximity within which it was actualized, and the grievous
international dangers that its inevitable existence would have presented. We have
observed Saddam Hussein’s demonstrable desire to acquire WMDs, his unrelenting noncompliance, and how close he was to achieving weaponization. Additionally, we have
covered the dwindling usefulness of the sanctions that temporarily held Saddam’s
acquisition at bay. Finally, we now also know why Saddam Hussein would not be just a very
dangerous, but a singularly and uniquely dangerous owner of a WMD stockpile. Chapter 3
has argued that the decision to intervene in 2003’s Iraq meets the six demands of Just War
Theory: possessing a just cause, holding the right intention, deciding through the proper
authority, making that decision publicly, regarding the action as a last resort, having a high
probability of success, and exacting proportional damage and casualties. It is according to
this rubric that the Security Argument is vindicated as a just contention for war.
In Chapter 5, an examination of Iraq’s modern oil state was conducted and came to
the conclusion that, despite many questionable factors surrounding the former Vice
President of the United States, the torpid and now moribund chant of ‘no blood for oil’ has
been demonstrated as fatuous. The intervention’s adherence to the principles of Just War
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Theory remained unbroken during this paper’s exploration of the much expatiated oil
factor.
Finally, the question of the war’s legality was addressed in Chapter 6. The
conclusions reached were internationally critical and domestically quarrelsome. While it is
entirely clear that the intervention was an internationally illegal conflict according to the
text of the UN Charter, the question of local unconstitutionality within the United States is
more challenging to assess. In either case, however, the constitution apportions the role of
war declaration to the Congress. Thus, the passage of the Iraq War Resolution by the
Congress constitutes the opinion of a ‘proper authority’ in the matter of declaring conflict.
As a result, the question of the war’s legality does not debar the intervention from meeting
the requirements of modern Just War Theory.
In light of these standards being dealt with, the intervention of 2003 qualifies as a
Just War. However, what does this mean for international politics at large? With the case of
Saddam Hussein’s WMD development being singular in nature, the repercussions of
determining the intervention as Just are thankfully limited. When considering the scenario
of a figure as historically volatile and confessedly belligerent as Saddam Hussein actively
pursuing the production and purchase of WMDs, it is difficult to come up with any names.
Even the regimes of North Korea and Iran exemplify far superior historical records on the
question of WMD use, vocalized threats, and associations with suicide-charged terrorists.
For international law, however, one must hope for a swift change in how threats of this
stratospheric nature are more effectively managed by the United Nations. Whether or not
the legacy left by the Iraq War changes these precedents for the better, remains to be seen.
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Appendix A
Iraq's Gross Domestic Product (World Bank), GDP in Current U.S. Dollars; Not Adjusted for Inflation

Event Timeline Reference:
1980 -1988: Iran-Iraq War
1991-2003: Gulf War + Sanctions
2003: Intervention

Source:
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_cd&idim=count
ry:IRQ&dl=en&hl=en&q=iraq+gdp
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Appendix B
Map
Source: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/iraq.html
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